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INTRODUCTION 
NARRATIVE FRAMES AS RHETORICAL STRATEGY: 
THE ARGUMENT AND RELEVANT SCHOLARSHIP 
My project in this thesis is to dispute the widely 
held belief that in A Room of one's Own, Virginia Woolf 
advocates the development of an androgynous perspective as 
necessary for women writers to produce literature. My 
endeavor is occasioned by the nature of the misreadings 
following from that premise: on one hand, those that see 
Woolf's feminism as compromised by her perceived 
endorsement of "androgyny"; on the other, those that 
embrace "androgyny" as a viable approach to fema l e 
authority. In particular, I take issue with the obviation 
of the narrative frames of A Room of One's own required to 
sustain such readings. My own reading of A Room of One's 
Own valorizes the narrative distinction that Virginia Woolf 
draws between herself and the persona Mary Beton, and 
demonstrates how this distinction serves to elevate "a room 
of one's own" 1 over "androgyny" as an approach to female 
authority. In addition, I contend that throughout the 
first five chapters, Mary Beton subtl y undermines her own 
proposal of "androgyny" in the f inal chapter by 
1 
establishing contexts that preclude the viabili ty of 
"androgyny" as a means for women to effect authority. 
2 
From the very first sentence of Virginia Woolf's ~ Room 
of One's own--"But, you may say, we asked you to speak on 
Women and Fiction; what has a room of one ' s own to do wi th 
that?" (4)--we are encouraged to be discriminating, to 
demand a n explanation when the parameters of the discussion 
change , as they so often do in that amalgamation of s ocial 
critique, literary history, and feminis t theory. Not only 
the parameters of the topic shift, but the speakers do a s 
well, for the lecturejessay begins in Virginia Woolf' s 
voice, turns to the narration of the presumably 
a utobiographical "Mary Beton," and ends with a conclusion 
and peroration by Woolf. These a l ternations too require 
explanation. One purpose of thi s thesis i s to examine how 
these shifts of narrative frame impact our understanding of 
women's authority ( "Women and Fiction") as it is 
differently delineated by Woolf and Beton. As a 
provisional definition, I mean by " authority" the ability 
to convey meaning through l i terary wri ting . Later, in 
chapter one of thi s thesis, I will address some of the 
considerati ons that complicate this defini tion; I will also 
discuss how female a uthority may be differentiated from 
male authori ty. 
I n the f irst chapter, Wo olf conjures up Ma ry Beton as 
her objectif i ed double, ostensibl y to demonstrate how , in 
the two days prior to her lecture, Woolf arrived at the 
conclusion, "a woman must have money and a room of her own 
if she is to write fiction" (4). True to her purpose, in 
the first five chapters Beton chronicles the experiences, 
research, and contemplation that would lead to Woolf's 
assertion. In fact, at the close of chapter five, Beton 
reiterates Woolf's claim, applying it to "an unknown girl 
writing her first novel in a bed-sitting-room": 
Give her another hundred years, I concluded, 
reading the last chapter ... give her _g room of 
her own and five hundred _g year, let her speak 
3 
her mind and leave out half what she now puts in, 
and she will write a better book one of these 
days. She will be a poet, I said, putting Life's 
Adventure, by Mary Carmichael, at the end of the 
shelf, in another hundred years' time. 
(164, emphasis added) 
At that juncture the narration comes full circle--Beton has 
accomplished what Woolf proposed she should, and arrived at 
the same conclusion. If Woolf were to resume the narration 
at this point, moving right into the peroration, we would 
have a continuous and coherent argument that "Intellectual 
freedom depends upon material things. Poetry depends upon 
intellectual freedom. And women have always been 
poor • .. t ha t i s why I have l a i d s o much stress on money and 
4 
a room of one's own" (188). Instead, Mary Beton begins the 
final chapter with a new argument. 
Done with her research, and at the point of actually 
writing the paper that will be delivered to an audience of 
college women, Mary Beton asserts that an author must 
develop an androgynous perspective to overcome the sex-
consciousness that impedes authority. She first 
hypothesizes "androgyny" as "two sexes in the mind 
corresponding to the two sexes in the body," that "must 
have intercourse" (170). Then, after a br i ef review of 
modern male writing, Beton becomes more insistent, 
advocating "androgyny" as a "marriage of opposites" that 
11 must be consurnmated11 "before the act of creati on can be 
accomplished" (181). 
Any critical reading of A Room of One's Own must come 
to terms with this abrupt change of focus, and address its 
relationship to the original argument. I contend that 
because "a room of one's own" represents not only women's 
economic freedom from men, but also their intellectual and 
sexual autonomy, "androgyny" figured as a sexual imperative 
is an insupportable conclusion, a non-sequitur. 
We must keep in mind that Mary Beton is a character, 
fictionally re-enacting the considerations that led Woolf 
to hold the opinion that women need money and "rooms of 
their own" to write fiction. Fore most among such 
considerations is the disempowerment of women due to their 
5 
socially-enforced dependence on men, which leads Beton, 
like Woolf, to suggest the converse as a solution: women's 
independence from men, symbolized as "a room of one's own." 
Beton has noted the soci a l reform that makes such an 
assertion plausible--women's recently acquired rights to 
own property, enter the professions, and vote. Stil l, 
there are other considerations that threaten such advances: 
in particular, how men will react to women with "rooms of 
their own." That is the concern that emerges as Beton 
reviews contemporary male writing in the final chapter. 
What she finds in that survey is overt misogyny, more 
purposeful than before, and foreboding "an age to come of 
pure, of self-assertive virility" akin to the "unmitigated 
masculinity," already manifest in Fascist Italy. I suggest 
that in the final chapter, Beton attempts to defuse such 
anger, deferring the provocative idea of "a room of one's 
own" to espouse the conciliatory concept of "androgyny" 
instead. 
Again, the rhetorical strategy of A Room of One's Own 
dictates that these considerations and Beton's responses be 
qualified with reference to Woolf's conclusion. While 
Woolf may indeed have experienced the misgivings 
represented by Beton, even likewise succumbing to them at 
some point, she ultimately decides to advocate women's 
pursu i t o f " r o oms o f their own," des p i t e the threat of male 
intolerance. When speaking in her own person, Woolf makes 
no mention of "androgyny," either in the introduction or 
the conclusion that bound Beton's narration. Instead, 
Woolf's thesis, 11 a woman must have money and a room of her 
own if she is to write fiction," is reiterated in the 
conclusion as a prophecy: 
6 
For my belief i s that if we live another century 
or so .•• and have five hundred a year each of us 
and rooms of our own; if we have the habit of 
freedom and the courage to write exactly what we 
think; if we escape a little from the common 
sitting-room and see human beings not always in 
their relation to each other but in relation to 
reality •.• if we face the fact, for it is a fact, 
that there is no arm to cling to, but that we go 
alone and that our relation is to the world of 
reality and not only the world of men and women, 
then the opportunity will come and the dead poet 
who was Shakespeare's sister will put on the body 
which she has so often laid down. Drawing her 
life from the lives of the unknown who were her 
forerunners, as her brother did before her, she 
will be born. ( 199) 
Many critics do not acknowledge the narrative 
distinction between Woolf and Beton, and those who do 
generally minimalize its s i gnificance. Elaine Showalter, 
for example, argues in her oft-cited "Virginia Woolf and 
7 
the Flight into Androgyny," that the frame surrounding Mary 
Beton is negligible, a defensive attempt at impersonality, 
and that "androgyny" and "a room of one's own" are 
contiguous: "androgyny is the psychological and theoretical 
extension of the material reform implied in the private 
room" (285). She claims further that both models for 
authority are ineffective and dangerous for women to adopt, 
for they promote asexuality, withdrawl, even suicide. 
Marilyn Farwell also perceives the distinction between 
Woolf and Beton to be insubstantial, "not enough to negate 
the strong monistic definition of androgyny." Like 
Showalter, she sees Woolf's disclaimer--"'!' is only a 
convenient term for somebody who has no real being" (5)--as 
a weak gesture toward anonymity that "has never been enough 
to separate Woolf from the "I" of this essay" (451). 
Farwell 's excellent essay, "Virginia Woolf and 
Androgyny," provides a historical review of androgyny that 
distinguishes between androgyny defined (within Eastern 
tradition) as a "balance" between equally-valued male and 
female characteristics, and androgyny defined (within 
Western tradition) as a monistic "fusion," wherein the 
lesser-valued characteristics of the Other (female) are 
purified and assimilated into the one (male). She argues 
that while Beton's first, tentative image of androgyny is 
aligned with "balance ," which would allow f or wome n to 
write in an identifiably feminine manner, Beton's second 
and definitive version is a model for "fusion" that "asks 
women to write like men" and therefore undermines female 
authority . 
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Jane Marcus also denies the feasibility of androgyny 
as a model for female authority, and objects vehemently in 
Virginia Woolf and the Languages of Patriarchy2 that Woolf 
never sincerely advocated androgyny as Beton envisions it. 
However , Marcus does not, as I do, exclude such androgyny 
from Woolf ' s provisions for female authority on the basis 
of the narrative distinction between Woolf and Beton. 3 
Marcus argues instead that the "androgyny" metaphor is set 
off from the rest of the d i scourse by i ts tone and imagery. 
Citing the image that prompts Beton to construe the "union 
of man and woman" as a metaphor for androgynous mind, the 
image of a single leaf falling, "like a signal falling, a 
signal pointing to a force in things which one had 
overlooked," Marcus associates that leaf with the voice of 
"the mother . 11 This connection between leaf and mother , she 
argues, is first established in To the Lighthouse, and 
reinforced in A Room of One's Own by the remi nder, directly 
following the leaf image, that "a woman writing thinks back 
through her mothers. 11 Marcus avers: 
Interleaving the woman's story in the male book 
of history is the project of A Room of One's Own. 
One o f t he l eaves in t h e woma n' s bo ok , its most 
problematic page, is the single leaf speaking in 
9 
the mother's voice, of the dangers of separating 
oneself off from patriarchy. Women readers share 
the writer's anxiety at the return of the 
repressed maternal imperative and join the 
narrator in struggling with her ghost . (161- 62) 
In the foregoing paragraphs, I have noted how some 
women readers have come to terms with Beton's metaphor of 
androgyny, that "most problematic page" in the text of 
A Room of One's Own. While I agree with Showalter, 
Farwell, and Marcus that androgyny, as such, would diminish 
women's authority, I do not concur with their ellision of 
the narrative distinction between Woolf and Beton . By 
circumscribing Mary Beton and her metaphor for androgyny 
within a narrative frame, Woolf allows herself a critical 
margin, from which she can either corroborate or qualify 
Beton's inferences. 
I disagree with Showalter's reading because it 
dismisses "a room of one ' s own" along with "androgyny" as 
if the same rationale and impetus informed both. And, 
while Farwell's exegesis of two disparate traditions of 
definition--androgyny as "balance" and androgyny as 
11 fusion"- - is useful, and her warning that an androgynyous 
"fusion" actually elevates masculinity to universality is 
well-taken, I believe she is mistaken in identifying 
Beton's first depiction of androgyny with "balance," and 
Beton ' s second, more polemical version with "fusion"; 
10 
instead, both versions encourage a "fusion," figured as 
heterosexual intercourse. This clarification is important, 
for it admits of the contrast--marked in the text by the 
shift from the fifth to the final chapter--between 
"a room of one's own" and "androgyny"; between women's 
authority as a topic of conversation and contemplation, and 
women's authority as the subject of a paper written to be 
delivered in public, then published in book form. 
As a published work, A Room of One's own would no 
longer have an exclusi vely female audience, and would 
therefore be subject to male censure and reprisal. As Mary 
Beton actually comes to the point of writing the lecture, 
her fear of such repercussions surfaces, and she abdicates 
her argument for "a room of one's own" to espouse 
"androgyny" instead. By creating Beton as a double who 
embodies her "limitations, prejudices, and idiosyncrasies," 
Woolf shows how compelling the compromise and self-
censorship that patriarchy inculcates in women can be, even 
to a woman as intelligent and as advantaged as herself. 
However, by separating herself from those views by a 
narrative frame, Woolf rejects that compromise in her own 
person. In effect, she triumphs in spite of herself, in 
spite of her indoctrination as what she later terms "an 
educated man's daughter 11 (3Gs 5). 4 
To reject the pre judices of that background is the 
radical and necessary first step toward "the development by 
11 
the average woman of a prose style completely expressive of 
her mind" (ROO 165). There will be no exemplar of female 
genius, no Judith Shakespeare, nor even a Mary Carmichael, 
unless some modern woman can renounce the biases and fear 
used to oppress her. That is precisely what Woolf 
accomplishes through the ingenious rhetorical strategy of A 
Room of One's Own. 
My understanding of Woolf's intent is most closely 
aligned with Jane Marcus's in that we both consider 
"androgyny" and the heterosexual mandate of its metaphor to 
be the exception rather than the rule within the feminist 
theory of A Room of One's Own. Marcus asserts that Woolf 
elevates the provisions for authority particular to women 
and women's experience ("a room of one's own11 ) above 
11 androgyny" on the basis of feminist privilege: 
In trying to deal with the maternal imperative, 
the definition of the feminine as opposite of the 
masculine, the imaginary "cooperation of the 
sexes," Woolf hits on a temporary solution in the 
idea of androgyny: "Ought not education to bring 
out and fortify the differences rather than the 
similarities? For we have too much likeness as it 
is." Androgyny means erasure of difference. How 
can she hold both views at once? Androgyny, it 
become s c lear, is a good i dea f or overly 
masculine writers to try, though the opposite 
does not hold true. That is, the arguments are 
not logical. She is biased in favor of women. 
(174) 
12 
There is much evidence in ~ Room of One's own to support 
this conclusion, and it is consistent with my contention 
that Beton's precipitate support of "androgyny" comes after 
her survey of "overly masculine writers" indicates the 
disastrous social circumstances these men might effect with 
their misogynist rhetoric. However, the interplay between 
narrative frames is another rationale for excluding 
"androgyny" from the provisions for female authority that 
Woolf endorses in A Room of One's Own, a rationale that 
supercedes both the "falling leaf" portent and the 
indications of feminist bias that Marcus cites. 
I join Marcus in protesting the disproportionate 
emphasis that many critics place upon the "androgyny" 
model, an emphasis that serves male interests and the 
status quo rather than illuminating Woolf's more radical 
proposals for women's authority. However, such readings 
are not relegated strictly to male critics, as Marcus 
implies in her criticism of interpretations by Geoffrey 
Hartmann and J. Hill i s Miller: 
Both men see this passage as descriptive of the 
source of Woolf's creativity, a recognition of a 
"force " in nature. Frankly, e v e ry woman r ead e r I 
know sees this passage as Woolf's mnemonic device 
13 
to force herself out of her feminist and lesbian 
fantasy world, back to a realization that 
"heterosexuality makes the world go round." That 
couple is Woolf's rude reminder to herself that 
women are not part of a woman's community but are 
isolated from each other in relation to 
individual men. It i s a reminder to herself that 
the male reader is out there, and she placates 
him with thi s mysterious heterosexual romance. 
(159) 
There are women readers too who understand "androgyny" as 
the central tenet of Woolf's feminist theory. Yet, like 
Showalter and Farwell, they are more likely than male 
critics to reject "androgyny" as a viable approach to 
female authority. Although Farwell at least acknowledges a 
radical subtext and a "whispered rebuttal" to "androgyny" 
in a Room of One's Own, Showalter repudiates Woolf's 
conjectures in their entirety. My concern in this thesis 
is that we not dismiss Virginia Woolf's feminist theory in 
a Room of One's Own on the basis of her protagonist/narrat-
or's metaphor for androgyny. 
More disconcerting than the critics who interpret 
"androgyny" as the prevailing message of A Room of One's 
own are the women readers who consequently affirm 
"androgyny" as a perspective wome n writers should emulate , 
and as the theory that informs Woolf's own writing, 
14 
particularly To the Lighthouse. Carolyn Heilbrun, for 
example, suggests in Toward £ Recognition of Androgyny that 
the androgynous perspective allows persons of both sexes to 
exhibit characteristics traditionally restricted to one sex 
or the other. 5 However, her reading of To the Lighthouse, 
"Woolf's best novel of androgyny," excoriates Mrs. Ramsay's 
"femininity"--it is "devouring," "ensnaring," "seductive," 
and "fatal"--while at the same time exonerating Mr. 
Ramsay's "masculinity" from its implications of "tyranny" 
and "sterility," leaving us in no doubt as to the 
respective desirability of masculine and feminine traits as 
they comprise the androgynous "range of human possibility." 
In reading the Ramsay family romance as a parable of 
androgyny, Heilbrun regards the offspring of this "marriage 
of opposites" as representing androgynous perspective. Yet 
the instances she designates as James's and Cam's 
"androgynous visions" are moments when each affirms Mr. 
Ramsay and the masculine perspective, leaving behind their 
affinity with Mrs. Ramsay. Indeed, the "feminine" 
influence on their androgyny is questionably necessary at 
all: "Readers have seldom been clear as to whether her son 
and daughter reach the lighthouse because her spirit 
survived her death, or because her death has liberated her 
children" (75). The lighthouse that Heilbrun identifies as 
a symbol of androgyny is more precisely a phallic symbol of 
masculinity, just as the island that Cam and James leave 
15 
behind on their excursion to the lighthouse is a symbol of 
the feminine, depicted in vaginal imagery . 
Although To the Lighthouse is useful as a reference to 
the dynamics of patriarchal marriage and compulsory 
heterosexuality that inform Mary Beton's metaphor of 
androgynous mind, I contend that such reference in no way 
supports the viability of "androgyny" as a model for female 
authority. Rather, equivocation of masculinity and 
androgyny and a corresponding denigration of the feminine 
are implicit within Beton's metaphor for androgyny and are 
inevitably promulgated by readings that utilize "Woolf ' s" 
concept of "androgyny" as an interpretive construct . Ellen 
Tremper ' s recent article, "In Her Father's House: To the 
Lighthouse as a Record of Virginia Woolf's Literary 
Patrimony," is the legacy of such readings, and consciously 
endorses the male-identification that Heilbrun understood 
and represented as 11 androgyny." Tremper ' s reading of To 
the Lighthouse attests to the centrality of masculine 
heroic rhetoric and convention (as propounded by Leslie 
Stephen and Mr. Ramsay) in the making of both the woman 
writer (Virginia Woolf) and the woman artist (Lily 
Briscoe). While it offers essentially the same exoneration 
of Mr. Ramsay and the same condemnation of Mrs . Ramsay that 
Heilbrun ' s reading does, Tremper adds the contingent and 
incendiary claim that Woolf (and Lily) adopt an aesthetic 
that in effect countenances the rape of the woman artist: 
16 
although Woolf, not surprisingly and especially 
in light of her own unfortunate and entirely 
unmetaphorical sexual history, recognized a 
pattern of social and cul tural "rape" of women, 
her writings acknowledge that women have 
nevertheless also gained from their intel l ectual 
contact with their oppressors. 
To the Lighthouse is about a woman's 
development and her intellectual and emotional 
debt to a man. (2) 
The quotation marks that set off the word "rape" minimalize 
such occurrence, and denote a compartmentalization so 
complete that within the space of a sentence, Tremper 
transposes "a woman's" acknowledgement of male influence 
into a "debt," which we must surmise that "a woman" has 
incurred from being "raped." Yet Tremper does not put what 
women have "gained from their intellectual contact with 
men" into perspective against what women have been deprived 
of by that oppression--the freedom and opportunity to 
develop their own intellectual capacities and to determine 
the kind of "contact" they have with men. In this thesis, 
I suggest that such freedom and opportunity are 
metaphorized by Woolf as "a room of one's own." 
Although Tremper characterizes Mr. Ramsay's demands 
upon Mrs. Ramsay as "ma l e aggres sion" (25), and recognizes 
Lily's "sexual terror" (19) when he makes similar demands 
17 
of her, she rationalizes that terror as the virgin's fear 
of her own attraction (20), a "sexual confusion" to be 
rectified by attaining "the ability first to copy Mrs. 
Ramsay's well-practiced strategy for meeting her husband's 
demand for sympathy, and then, by so doing, really feel it" 
(18). By neglecting to delineate Woolf's depiction of the 
"social and cultural 'rape' of women" in its specific 
manifestations, Tremper glosses this "rape" as a rite of 
passage, a "created and 'creative• communion between Lily 
and Mr. Ramsay" (4), and a "human and creative solution" 
(10) to be celebrated rather than reviled. Tremper asserts 
that for Lily this moment of revelation is the result of 
her adaptation of "the masculine principle," "making her 
experience possible through a sort of inclusive creative 
'androgyny'" (6). In Tremper's reading, the equivocation 
between masculinity and androgyny implicit in Beton's 
metaphor becomes explicit. 
The following chapters substantiate the claims 
outlined in this introduction, although not strictly in the 
order listed, because the proofs overlap. First, that the 
narrative frame that distinguishes the lecturer, Vi rginia 
Woolf, from the persona, Mary Beton, also establishes "a 
room of one's own" as Woolf's considered response to the 
question of how women can effect authority; Beton's 
"androgyny" simply r epre s e nts the f inal consideration Woolf 
came to terms with in drawing her conclusion. Second, that 
18 
the imagery and implications of ua room of one's own" that 
Beton develops in the first five chapters create a context 
that discredits "androgyny" as a state of mind that women 
should cultivate; in fact, the patriarchal ideology that 
Beton incorporates into her metaphor for "androgyny" would 
in effect compromise women's literary authority. 
Before undertaking these proofs, however, I will 
review Woolf's concept of authority and the factors that 
she claims enable or impede a writer's ability to effect 
such authority. I will also note how these considerations 
are particularized for women and for men. 
CHAPTER I 
MODERN AUTHORITY AND WOMEN'S AUTHORITY: ESSAYS l918-1 925 
Virginia Woolf's general concept of narrative 
authority is most clearly defined and developed in her 
essays regarding the ability of two particular groups to 
produce literature: modern writers and women writers. 
In the decade prior to the publication of A Room of One's 
Own, Woolf wrote three essays--"Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown" 
{B&Br), "Modern Fiction" (MF), and "How it Strikes a 
Contemporary" (HSC), 6 that together comprise an apology for 
Modern writing. In that same time, she wrote two reviews--
"Women Novel ists" (WN) and "Men and Women" {MW) , and a 
letter of rebuttal--"The Intellectual status o f Womenn 
(ISW), that form the genes i s of her apology for women's 
writing, more thoroughly developed in A Room of One's Own. 
While defending both modern and women writers against the 
disparaging judgements o f contemporary critics, Woolf has 
occasion to remark the characteristics that confer 
authority to a written work, that establish it as a 
"masterpiece." 
Above all, Woolf insists, a masterpiece must depict 
"thi ngs in themselv es"; it must h a v e no u lterior pur p ose , 
such as to proselytize or provide a forum for the author's 
19 
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personal grievances. Accordingly, the author of a 
masterpi ece must be free from any self-consciousness that 
may detract from his or her ability to represent "things in 
themselves." In addition, a masterpiece must convey a 
conviction of truth compell ing enough to supersede the 
reader's personal experience. This conviction of truth, 
{what Mary Beton describes in A Room of One's own as 
"integrity") depends upon the author's impli cit bel i ef 
"that life is of a certain quality" (HSC 358), as 
determined by a stable social code. Readers, conditioned 
by literature to recogni ze certain narrative conventions as 
indicative of a "reality" that conforms to that soci al 
code, then accept the author's conviction as constituting 
"truth." Finally, a masterpiece must be a coherent whole, 
forming "that complete statement which is literature" (HSC 
358) . 
Woolf observes that although such authority mani fests 
itself readi ly in the time between the Elizabethan and 
Victorian eras, it has been inconstant, if not altogether 
absent, since; moreover, it has been lacking throughout the 
history of women's writing, excepting a few works by Jane 
Austen and Emily Bronte. 
For the Moderns, this difficulty in effecting 
authori ty results from a change in human nature, a shi ft in 
sensibili t y t hat has a l iena t e d them from t h e pas t a n d its 
literary conventions. Their interest l ies in "the dark 
21 
places of psychology" (MF 156) rather than with broad 
social commentary. Woolf is rather vague as to the cause 
of this change, simply pronouncing its occurrence--"On or 
around December, 1910, 7 human nature changed" (B&Br 194), 
or explaining briefly: "a shift in the scale--the war, the 
sudden slip of masses held in position for ages--has shaken 
the fabric top to bottom" (HSC 357) . Still, its impact on 
literature is clear: "Whether we call it life or spirit, 
truth or reality, this, the essential thing has moved off 
or on, and refuses to be contained any longer in such ill-
fitting vestements as we provide" (MF 287). While the 
Edwardians--Wells, Galsworthy, and particularly Arnold 
Bennett--still maintain that "house property" and other 
material circumstances constitute "reality," and have 
conditioned the public to believe that it is so, the 
Moderns, without a tradition or conventions to help them, 
must attempt to convey to that same public a psychological 
concept of reality (B&Br 208-09). These are the 
circumstances that cause their writing to be self-
conscious. 
Notably, when Woolf discusses Modern writing, she 
refers exclusively to male writers--Forster, Lawrence, 
Joyce, Strachey, and Eliot. Although women, including 
Woolf, wrote prolifically during the Modern period, Woolf 
chooses to consider wome n writers of that era as a 
continuation of a woman's tradition, rather than as part of 
22 
the Modern movement--an alienated, but nonetheless 
legitimate descendant of the patriarchal literary tradition 
which has always excluded women writers. 8 
Unlike Modern [male) writers, women have not suddenly 
become self-conscious, but have suffered for centuries from 
trying to write seriously within a patriarchy that enforces 
their dependence, subservience, and "moral purity119 (WN 
70). As a result, women's writing is conciliatory or 
defiant; in either case, it loses its focus on the subject 
in its reaction to external criticism (WN 70). Although 
there is hope for the future in that "the seventeenth 
century produced more remarkable women than the sixteenth, 
the eighteenth than the seventeenth, and the nineteenth 
than all three put together" (ISW 55), Woolf asserts, "the 
effect of these repressions is still clearly to be traced 
in women's writing, and the effect is wholly to the bad" 
(WN 69). 
Woolf's defense of Modern and women writers consists 
largely of pointing out the circumstances that cause their 
self-consciousness, and recontextualizing assessments of 
the value of their writing in terms of what it portends for 
the future, rather than what it lacks in comparison to the 
past. 10 
According to Woolf, the primary virtue of Modern 
writing is its s incerity. She explains: "The y attempt to 
come closer to life, and to preserve more sincerely and 
23 
exactly what interests and moves them, even if to do so 
they must discard most of the conventions which are 
commonly observed by the novelist" (MF 155). Citing James 
Joyce as Modernism's most representative writer, Woolf 
elaborates: 
In contrast with those whom we have called 
materialists [Bennett, Wells, and Galsworthy] 
Mr. Joyce is spiritual; he is concerned at all 
costs to reveal the flickerings of that innermost 
flame which flashes its messages through the 
brain, and in order to preserve it he disregards 
with complete courage whatever seems to him 
adventitious, whether it be probability, or 
coherence or any other of these signposts which 
for generations have served to support the 
imagination of a reader when called upon to 
imagine what he can neither touch nor see ... If we 
want life itself, here [in Portrait of the Artist 
as~ Young Man], surely we have it. (MF 155) 
Woolf's commendation is qualified by her awareness that 
Modern writing is still self-conscious--Joyce's "indecency" 
is "conscious and calculated," Eliot's "obscurity" arises 
from "intolerance,n and Strachey•s "discreet code of 
manners" conceals subject matter that would elsewise be 
censored (B&Br 210-211). It is due to such efforts o f 
"concealment and conversion," claims Woolf, that "truth" 
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comes to the reader only in fragments (B&Br 211) . Woolf 
also criticizes the inability of such writing to 
generalize, to "embrace or create what is outside itself 
and beyond" (MF 156) . Yet rather than dismissing Modern 
writing because of these limitations, Woolf insists that 
for the present, conventions must be sacrificed and 
fragments tolerated if we are ever to get a true version of 
the "unlimited capacity and infinite variety" of "life 
itself" (B&Br 212) as it is in the present. Thus, she 
suggests that in place of conventions (determined by the 
age and a particular culture), we approach fiction aware of 
"the infinite possibilities of the art" and cognizant that 
"there is no limit to the horizon, and that nothing--no 
'method, ' no experiment, even of the wildest- -is forbidden, 
but only falsity and pretence. 'The proper stuff of 
fiction' does not exist; everything is the proper stuff of 
fiction" (MF 158). Woolf also suggests that both writers 
and readers change their expectations regarding the 
coherence of a work: 
It is true that the writer of the present day 
must renounce his hope of making that complete 
statement which we call a masterpiece. He must 
be content to be a taker of notes. But if 
notebooks are perishable volumes, he may reflect 
that the y are, after all, the stuff from which 
the masterpieces of the future are made. Truth, 
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again to speak in the manner of the myth-makers, 
has always been thus volatile, sometimes coming 
quietly into the open and suffering herself to be 
looked at, at others flying averted and obscured. 
But if she is the truth then we do well to watch 
for her most brief apparitions; and the sight of 
her will convince us that she is always the same, 
from Chaucer even to Mr. Conrad. The difference 
is on the surface; the continuity in the depths. 
(HSC 359) 
In the early 1920's, Woolf had a good deal of 
confidence in the future of Modern fiction; she believed 
that it would not only continue the tradition that has 
persisted from Chaucer to Conrad, but also that it would be 
an exceptional era amongst them. In fact, in 1924 she made 
the "surpassingly rash prediction" that "we are trembling 
on the verge of one of the great ages of English 
literature" (B&Br 212). 
At the same time, Woolf's prognosis for women's 
writing was more reserved, despite the progress shown in 
the past four centuries (ISW 55), and despite the social 
'evolution'll that enabled some women to be 'emancipated' 
from their dependence on men, and from the servility that 
dependence exacted. In 1920 she wrote: 
Granted that the woman of the middle class has 
now some leisure, some education, and some 
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liberty to investigate the world in which she 
lives, it will not be in this generation or in 
the next that she will have adjusted her position 
or given a clear account of her powers. (MW 67) 
Woolf's hesitancy regarding the future of women's authority 
was based on the following concerns: that the language and 
forms of fiction in use during the modern age were over-
determined by male concerns, and women had yet to develop 
new ones; that women would have to find ways to integrate 
their proclivity for fiction writing with faculties they 
developed within the strictures of patriarchy; and that it 
was unclear whether men would accommodate such changes. 
These same concerns are addressed more thoroughly in 
A Room of One's Own, but with the explicit intent of 
encouraging women to write. Thus Woolf not only sets forth 
the material circumstances and freedom from the constraints 
of "respectability" that women require in order to write, 
but she also excavates a women's tradition of writing, 
critiquing it as she does so, in order to show women a 
direction for the future. Woolf asserts that in the 
future, women must develop a language, style, and genre 
specific to their experience. In addition, she indicates 
that women should incorporate into their writing the 
"unconventionality," "subtlety," and lack of egotism 
("anonymity") they have already developed in response to 
patriarchy. By the end of her argument, Woolf proclaims 
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that despite the poverty and obscurity women continue to 
write in, it is coming within their power to bring into 
being a woman who will redeem the potential of women's 
writing, a Judith Shakespeare (or Mary Carmichael] who will 
display such irrefutable authority that her example will 
justify the aspirations of other women to write (197-99). 
As she did with regard to the Moderns in essays such 
as "Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown," "Modern Fiction," and "How 
it strikes a contemporary," in !1 Room of One's own, Wool f 
recontextualizes the criticisms against women's writing to 
show hope for the future. However, this apology for 
women's writing is disrupted by Mary Beton's consideration 
of "a force in things which one had overlooked" (167}. 
That force (to be reckoned with) is the sex-consciousness 
of Modern men. 
Although Woolf had previously addressed the concerns 
of women and Modern [male] writers separately, as derived 
from different social circumstances and continuing 
different literary tradi tions, in !1 Room of One's own she 
confronts the possibility that the future of women's 
fiction may depend upon the extent to which men wil l 
accommodate the changes necessary for women to effect 
authority . Because literature not only reflects but 
informs soci al values, the writing of modern men is a 
s trong i ndi c a t i on of wha t wome n may e xpec t i n the f uture . 
Woolf had alluded to this contingency in 19 20, when 
she wrote, regarding the future of women's authority: 
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"To pour such surplus (creati ve energy ] as there may be 
into new forms without wasting a drop is the difficult 
problem which can only be solved by the simultaneous 
evolution and emancipation of man" (MW 67). And, according 
to her concurrent essays on Modern (male] wr i ting, there 
seemed to be hope that such change would occur. 12 In fact, 
in 1924, Woolf wrote of the soci al upheaval that shaped 
Modern writing: 
Do you ask for more solemn instances of the power 
of the human race to change? Read the Agamemnon, 
and see whether, in process o f time , your 
sympathi es are not almost entirely with 
Clytamnestra. Or, consider the married life of 
the carlyles and bewail the waste, the futility, 
for him and for her, of the horrible domestic 
tradition which made it seemly for a woman of 
genius to spend her t i me chasing beetles, 
scouring saucepans, instead of writing books. 
All human relations have shifted--those between 
masters and servants, husbands and wives, parents 
and children. And when human relations change 
there i s at the same time a change in religion, 
c onduc t , p o litics , a nd lit erature . (B&Br 219 ) 
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These changes seemed to indicate more respect and greater 
freedom for women. In addition, women would c l early 
benefit from the challenge that Modern writers posed to the 
conventi onal notions of "respectability" and "propriety"--
social expectations that had hampered women writers even 
more than men. However, by the time Woolf fin i shed A Room 
of One's Own in 1929, politics and literature a l ike were 
threatening a return to the oppressions of the past. 13 
Allusions to the misogynist sensibility of Fasci st 
Italy14 and to the obscenity trial of Radclyffe Hall's The 
Well of Loneliness15 (banned in England because of its 
lesbian content) establish the backdrop against which 
Woolf, or rather Mary Beton, reconsiders the writing of 
Modern [male ] authors as indicat i ve of men's receptiveness 
to women's increased independence. Beton's survey of 
"books by l iving writers" (172), Edwardians a nd Modern 
alike, suggest that "the simultaneous emancipation and 
evolution of man," which Woolf had claimed was necessary 
for women to gain authority, has not occurred . The writing 
of Edwardians, such as Kipling and Galsworthy, totally 
excludes women: 
Do what she will a woman cannot find in them that 
fountain of perpetual life which the critics 
assure her is there. It is not onl y that they 
celebrate male virtues , enforce male values a nd 
describe the world of men; it is that the emotion 
with which these books are permeated is to a 
woman incomprehensible. (177) 
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Likewise, the writing of the hypothetical Modern writer, 
Mr. A, 16 "in the prime of life and very well thought of, 
apparently, by the reviewers, 11 is dominated by the "I" of a 
male narrator, some Alan obliterating a Phoebe "in the 
flood of his views" (174). Through his writing "he is 
p~otesting against the equality of the other sex by 
asserting his own superiority" (175) as innumerable 
"professors"--11with no qualification save they are not 
women" (28)--have done before him. The cumulative effect 
of such chauvinist sentiment causes Beton to envision: 
an age to come of pure, of self-assertive 
virility, such as the letters of professors (take 
Sir Walter Raleigh's letters for instance) seem 
to forebode, 17 and the rulers of Italy have 
already brought into being. For one can hardly 
fail to be impressed in Rome by the sense of 
unmitigated masculinity; and whatever the value 
of unmitigated masculinity upon the state, one 
may question the effect of it upon poetry. (178-
79) 
This is the context that leads to Mary Beton's insistence 
that Modern writers should adopt an androgynous 
perspective. 
As the self-consciousness that Modern [male] writers 
experienced as a generation manifests itself more 
specifically as sex-consciousness, 18 it became clear to 
Woolf that such sex-consciousness threatened the recent 
social reforms--women•s rights to own property ( 1880), 
enter the professions (1918), and vote (1919)--that 
afforded contemporary women a greater degree of the 
intellectual freedom necessary to write literature. 
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Although Mary Beton proposes 11 androgyny 11 as a remedy 
for the sex-consciousness of both men and women-- 11 It is 
fatal to be a man or a woman pure and simple; one must be 
woman-manly or man-womanly11 (181)--her concern is clearly 
male sex-consciousness; indeed, her analysi s (in the 
previous chapter) of Mary Carmichael's novel as represent-
ative of contemporary women•s writing remarks in parti cular 
its lack of sex-consciousness (160-162). Beton•s general 
argument for 11 androgyny 11 is a pretext for a more specific 
cause: the attenuation of the 11 self-conscious virility11 and 
misogyny that flaws the writing of modern men and impinges 
upon women writers• prospects for authority. 
The duplicity of Beton•s argument is underscored by 
her condemnation of the suffragists for causing men to be 
sex-conscious, and by her idealization of an all-male 
tradition of 11 androgynous 11 writers. Beton avers: 
All seduce r s a nd refor me r s are respons i b le ... 
All who have brought about a state of sex-
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consciousness are to blame, and it i s they who 
drive me, when I want to stretch my faculties on 
a book, to seek it in that happy age, before Miss 
Davies and Miss Clough were born, when the writer 
used both sides of his mind equally. (179-80) 
Beton then proceeds to name Shakespeare, Keats, Sterne, 
Cowper, Lamb, Coleridge, Proust, and to a lesser extent, 
Shelley, Milton, Jonson, Wordsworth, and Tolstoy (180) as 
exemplars of the "androgyny" that Modern writers would do 
well to emulate. 
However, in the previous chapters, Beton has clearly 
noted the repressive circumstances that women endured in 
"that happy age" before the suffrage movement and the first 
world war altered their status : forced marriages, wife-
beating, the bearing and raising of too many children, 
poverty, and a lack of privacy. She has likewise clearly 
explained that the reason men did not experience sex-
consciousness then, was because male superiority was taken 
for granted. When Beton concludes, "Some collaboration has 
to take place in the mind between the woman and the man 
before the act of creation can be accomplished. Some 
marri age of opposites has to be consummated" (181), the 
audience of college women would be well aware of the 
incongruity of that conclusion--with the exclusively female 
means of empowerment she had supported up to that point . 
They would also recognize the compromise by women implicit 
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in the "androgyny" Beton espouses, particularly in its 
images of traditional marriage and intercourse. While they 
would acknowledge that the Suffragist s raised men's sex-
consciousness, and that men's sex-consciousness is cause 
for concern, they would a l so surely affirm that their 
circumstances would be worse if it were not for the efforts 
of women like Miss Davies and Miss Clough. 
However, college women were not the on l y audience, and 
it is the threat of censorship--a Sir Chartres Biron hiding 
behind the curtains (14 1 ), or a Sir Archibald Bodkin 
concealed in the cupboard (194)--and the threat of male 
repri sal that motivate the duplicity of both Woolf's and 
Beton's discourse. Woolf's discourse is dupl i citous in its 
use of two narrative frames. Beton's d i scourse is 
duplicitous in its use of a non-gender-specific proposal 
("androgyny") to promote a gender-specific change (the 
alleviation of male sex-consciousness). Before advocating 
"androgyny" for both men and women, Beton establishes 
contexts that discredit "androgyny" as an option women 
should pursue. 
"Androgyny" is best understood as tangential to the 
provisions for women's authority set forth in the main 
argument of A Room of One's own. Thus, while the first 
five chapters address ways in which women can empower 
t h e mselves t o wr ite l ite rat ure , (beginning by obtaining 
"rooms of their own" ) , "androgyny" is contrived as a remedy 
for the male sex-consciousness of men that impinges upon 
women's prospects for authority. "Androgyny" is not, in 
context , a sensibi lity that women could reasonably be 
expected to adopt; it is intended exclusively for men. 
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In this way, Woolf maintains the distinction between modern 
[male] authority and women's authority that she had 
developed throughout the decade prior to the publication of 
A Room of One's own . 
In this chapter, I have expl i cated Woolf ' s concept of 
authority in terms of the qualit i es she has indicated that 
elevate writing to literature and make for masterpieces: 
the depiction o f "things in themselves 11 ; the use of 
generally acknowledged conventions to evoke a conviction of 
"truth11 ; and the wholeness and coherence of a work. I have 
also explained that according to Woolf , the self- , or more 
specifically, sex-consciousness that inhibits literary 
authority results from different circumstances for men than 
for women. "Androgyny" and "a room of one ' s own" reflect 
that distinction, and are intended, respectively, as means 
for resolving men's sex-consciousness and women's sex-
consciousness. 
CHAPTER II 
"A ROOM OF ONE 1 S OWN11 AND nANDROGYNYn: TWO PRESCRIPTIONS 
FOR WOMEN'S AUTHORITY IN ft ROOM OF ONE 1 S OWN 
In A Room of One•s own, Virginia Woolf creates a 
depersonalized but distinctly gendered narrator, nr19 (call 
me Mary Beton, Mary Seton, Mary Carmichael or by any name 
you please- -it is not a matter of any importance) 11 (6), to 
mediate an investigation of women's authority titled 11Women 
and Fiction." The project is shaped by a number of issues 
stemming from three interrelated queries: "what (material] 
conditions are necessary for the creation of works of art?" 
(42), nwhat is the state of mind most propitious to the act 
of creation? .. (88), and "would the fact of her sex in any 
way interfere with the integrity of a woman novelist?" 
( 12 7) • 
Mary Beton proves herself to be a resourceful, 
incisive, and highly analytic investigator, interpreting 
history where she finds it (in the Times, on the shelves of 
the British Museum, in her scrapbook of misogynistic 
quotations called "Cock- a-doodle-dum 11 ) and construing 
herstory where she does not (the hypothetical biography of 
Judith Shakespeare and the hypothetical novel of Mary 
Carmichael, for instance), to defuse the masculine 
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indictment against women's authority--typified by the claim 
that women have produced no Shakespeare; to excavate a 
female literary tradition as the foundation of such 
authority; and to prescribe the circumstances that will 
facilitate women's authority in the future- -beginning with 
"a room of one's own" and the freedoms it implies. 
However, in the final chapter, Beton shifts her focus to 
"a force in things which one had overlooked" (167) and 
asserts that writers of both sexes should adopt an 
androgynous sensibility--an argument seemingly at cross-
purposes with the exclusively female sources of empowerment 
she advocated in the first five chapters. Perhaps the most 
important result of her narrative is the discourse it 
initiates by women about women, a discourse distinct from 
the overwhelming body of male opinion she herself finds 
during her research, and demonstrated by the sustained 
debate among women critics over the merits and/or flaws of 
Woolf's feminist theory as articulated in~ Room of One's 
own. 
While few women critics deny the value of Mary 
Beton's2° efforts to establish the material and social 
circumstances that precluded the possibility of women 
displaying Shakespeare's genius, or her naming of female 
forebearers and her emphasis on a female tradition- -"we 
think back through our mothers if we are women" (132), her 
supposed advocacy of androgynous mind as a model for female 
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authority draws mixed reviews. Carolyn Heilbrun and Nancy 
Topping Bazin21 celebrate this androgynous aesthetic, while 
Elaine Showalter finds the metaphor characteristic of 
Woolf's inability to come to terms with her female 
[hetero-)sexuality. Jane Marcus, on the other hand, sees 
"androgyny" as a "red herring" to deter the patriarchs from 
comprehending (and thus censoring) the "sapphistry" of the 
rest of the text. 
Heilbrun's and Bazin's positive responses to androgyny 
correspond to the positive view that the women's movement 
initially took toward androgyny in the early seventies, 
when it was seen as a concept that liberated women from the 
limitations of sex stereotypes. On the other hand, 
Showalter's negative response to androgyny is characterist-
ic of the disillusionment with which feminists came to 
regard that concept as they recognized that it still 
identified bipolar characteristics as gendered and that the 
"masculine" traits were still more valued than their 
"feminine" counterparts. The readings of Woolf's fiction 
that Heilbrun, Bazin, and Showalter derive from their 
interpretation of the "androgyny" metaphor in A Room of 
One's own are consistent with the status of androgyny 
within the ideology of the women's movement. Jane Marcus's 
readings are likewise informed by the ideologies of 
feminism in the late eighties, when feminist and lesbian-
feminist theorists began to reclaim traits that patriarchy 
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had conditioned women and men alike to believe were 
"masculine," such as anger and sexual desire. On the other 
hand, there are critics such as Tremper, who are reviving 
the rhetoric and arguments that supported androgyny, 
without adequately accounting for the problems and 
compromise it poses. 
This chapter proposes to give an overview of how Beton 
substantiates Woolf's thesis, "a woman must have money and 
a room of her own if she is to write fiction," and to 
demonstrate how, in terms of its imagery and implications, 
Beton's abrupt conclusion that women and men alike should 
write with an androgynous perspective is contrary to what 
"a room of one's own 11 entails for women writers. 
From Beton's theorizing, we can delineate three 
facets of authority requisite for the author to effect 
meaning: authorjity as having the necessary material 
circumstances to be an author, authority as received 
authorization, and authority as expertise in conventional 
craft or technique. 
Answering the question, "what conditions are necessary 
for the creation of works of art" (42}, Beton determines, 
as does Wool f, that in terms of material support, five 
hundred pounds and a room of one's own wi ll suffice. The 
money provides the economic independence that frees the 
woman writer from altering content in deference to the man 
who provides for her, and allows her the leisure to 
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contemplate. The room provides the privacy necessary to 
write without interruption or unsolicited advice from over-
the-shoulder readers. 
Addressing the question, 11what is the state of mind 
most propitious to the act of creation" (88}, Beton begins 
by showing the state of mind most adverse to it. She notes 
"the world's notorious indifference" to the male writer's 
burdens of authorship (90) and explains that the woman 
writer's agonies were compounded not only by indifference 
but by hostility as well. As evidence, she documents the 
proclamations of some of English society's most prominent 
patriarchs (foremost among them, Oscar Browning} 22 
regarding women's inability to write or think, and their 
insubordination in aspiring to do so (91-98, 100-l11). 
According to Beton, such hostility works as an obstacle 
within the mind, changing art into argument or propaganda, 
and forcing the author to write in counterpoint to 
criticism (l18-23, 126-131}, thus "thinking of something 
other than the thing itself" (129). She explains that 
although such obstacles may have been in the minds of male 
novelists, (partic~larly after the Suffrage campaign), they 
were almost assuredly in the minds of female novelists: 
But how impossible it must have been for them not 
to budge either to the right or left. What genius, 
what integrity it must have required in the face of 
all that criticism, in the midst of that purely 
patriarchal society, to hold fast to the thing as 
they saw it without shrinking. Only Jane Austen 
did it and Emily Bronte. (129-30) 
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Even worse for women's writing than the lack of 
authorization from contemporary society, however, was the 
lack of authorization provided by tradition, for as Beton 
says, "masterpieces are not single and solitary births; 
they are the outcome of many years of thinking in common, 
of thinking by the body of the people, so that the 
experience of the mass is behind the single voice" (113}. 
Since "we think back through our mothers if we are women" 
(132), and "since freedom and fullness of expression are of 
the essence of the art" (134), Beton concludes that "such a 
lack of tradition, such a scarcity and inadequacy of tools, 
must have told enormously upon the writing of women" (134). 
After establishing that hostility against one's writing and 
the lack of a tradition contribute to the state of mind 
most adverse to the act of creation, Beton proceeds to 
explain "the state of mind that is most propitious to the 
act of creation" (88): 
the mind of the artist, in order to achieve the 
prodigious effort of freeing whole and entire the 
work that is in him, must be incandescent, like 
Shakespeare's mind ... there must be no obstacle in 
it, no foreign matter unconsumed. (99) 
Beton later associates this state of mind with "androgyny." 
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First, however, she reveals that the 11 integrity" of the 
books manifested by such a mind is due to the fact that in 
literature, as in life, 11 it is the masculine values that 
prevail" (128). 
Clearly, then, Mary Beton's answer to the third 
question, "would the fact of her sex in any way interfere 
with the integrity of the woman novelist--that integrity 
which I take to be the backbone of the writer?" (127} is 
"yes"; hostility will beget hostility and women's works 
will be flawed according to conventions or standards that 
disavow protest, preaching, and revenge as legitimate aims 
of fiction {99, 117, 119, 129). 
Mary Beton's responses to her rhetorical questions 
suggest that integrity is a quality achieved only when 
adequate material circumstances, social sanction, and 
tradition converge, allowing an unobstructed view of 
"things in themselves." The ability to communicate one's 
vision with integrity is therefore the ability to effect 
authority. Mary Beton explains integrity thus: "What one 
means by integrity, in the case of the novelist, is the 
conviction that he gives one that this is the truth" (125). 
In addition, integrity is sustained throughout a work by 
coherence. Beton describes the craft by which the 
hypothetical novelist Mary Carmichael would create 
coherence in her work: 
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Now is the time, she would say to herself at a 
certain moment, when without doing anything 
violent I can show the meaning of all this. And 
she would begin--how unmistakable that quickening 
is--beckoning and summoning, and there would rise 
up in memory, half forgotten, perhaps quite 
trivial things in other chapters dropped by the 
way. And she would make their presence 
felt ... and one would feel, as she went on 
writing, as i f one had gone to the top of the 
world and seen it laid out, very majestically, 
beneath. ( 162-63) 
So defined, "integrity" and "coherence" seem to be rather 
simplistic and general concepts that could easily be 
equated with the demand for realism and self-referential 
order characteristic of male modernist fiction. They are, 
however, integrally re l ated to a very elaborate paradigm 
for authority that conflates sexuality, textuality, and an 
architecture of mind, body, and book. 
There are extenuating circumstances that affect the 
manifestation of integrity or coherence by an author. For 
instance, the integrity, or "conviction of truth," that an 
author elicits depends on his or her "freedom to think of 
things in themselves" (67). In chapter six, Beton suggests 
that freedom is won only by the mind that has sublimated 
its sex-consciousness in androgyny (170-71). Beton cites 
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Coleridge's concept of androgyny as explanation: "He meant, 
perhaps, that the androgynous mind is resonant and porous; 
that it transmits emotion without impediment; that it is 
naturally creative, incandescent and undivided" (~71). The 
division to be overcome by the androgynous mind is figured 
by Beton both as a separation of rooms and as a sexual 
separation. As an example of the first, we may consider 
the critic Mr. B: "the trouble was that his feelings no 
longer communicated; his mind seemed separated into 
different chambers; not a sound carried from one to the 
other" {176). In parallel terms, the division that must be 
overcome is a sexual distinction between male and female 
sensibilities; the manner in which it is overcome is 
likened to sexual intercourse: 
the sight of the two people getting into the taxi 
and the satisfaction it gave me made me ask 
whether there are two sexes in the mind 
corresponding to the two sexes in the body, and 
whether they also require to be united in order 
to get complete satisfaction and happiness? And 
I went on amateurishly to sketch a plan of the 
souls so that in each of us two powers preside, 
one male, one female; and in the man's brain, the 
man predominates over the woman, and in the 
woman's brain, the woman predominates over the 
man. The normal and comfortable state of being 
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is that when the two live in harmony together 
spiritually co-operating. If one is a man, still 
the woman part of the brain must have effect; and 
a woman also must have intercourse with the man 
in her .•. It is when this fusion takes place that 
the mind is fully fertilized and uses all its 
faculties. (170-71) 
Presumably, such intercourse would allow the strictly 
feminine sensibility to cast off the sense of chastity that 
restricts women from speaking of their experiences as a 
body (86-88); it would also provide an outlet for the 
strictly masculine sensibility that would otherwise 
obliterate everything, particularly women, in protest 
(173-75). 
Having established that such a "fusion" between the 
male and female halves of the mind must be procreative, 
Mary Beton concludes her sketch of the androgynous mind by 
recasting the sexual imperative within a marital context: 
"Some collaboration has to take place in the mind between 
the woman and the man before the act of creation can be 
accomplished. Some marriage of opposites has to be 
consummated" (180). Thus, the nature of the interaction 
between the male and female sensibilities in such a mind 
would be sexual, procreative, and legitimate rather than 
platonic, or hedonistic, or illicit.23 
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The author next has the task of fabricating the novel 
conceived, of imparting order and coherence. Appropriately, 
Beton uses architectural imagery to describe the 
construction of plot and character. Concerning content she 
claims, 
If one shuts one's eyes and thinks of the novel 
as a whole •.• it is a structure leaving a shape on 
the mind's eye, built now in squares, now pagoda 
shaped, now throwing out wings and arcades, now 
solidly compact and domed like the Cathedral of 
Saint Sofia at Constantinople. This shape, I 
thought, thinking back over certain famous 
novels, starts in one the kind of emotion that is 
appropriate to it. But that emotion at once 
blends itself with others, for the "shape" is not 
made by the relation of stone to stone, but by 
the relation of human being to human being. 
(123-24) 
It is important to recognize here that in the previous 
pages Beton has established that nearly all "certain famous 
novels" were written by men and depicted only relationships 
involving men. Novels about the relations between women 
were not written then (142-46); thus this "shape" 
determined by interpersonal relationships is a 
predominantly masculine "shape." In eliciting the "kind of 
emotion that is appropriate to it," it most often alienates 
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the woman reader, for "the emotion with which these books 
are permeated is to a woman incomprehensible" (177). In 
fact she is likely to feel like an outsider looking in, "as 
if one had been caught eavesdropping at some purely 
masculine orgy" (178). In this description of women's 
relation to male writing, imagery of architecture--
"structure" or "shape"--overlaps again with imagery of 
sexuality, both serving as metaphors for gendered 
sensibility and voice. 
Mary Beton's description of the ordering structures of 
fiction--syntax and genre--likewise conflates architecture 
and sexuality. She suggests that because "we think back 
through our mothers if we are women" (132), the "common 
sentence" that male writers had available for their use was 
unsuited for women (133). She continues her explanation 
thus: 
Moreover, a book is not made of sentences laid 
end to end, but of sentences built, if an image 
helps, into arcades and domes. And this shape 
too has been made by men out of their own needs 
for their own uses. There is no reason to 
suppose that the form of the epic or of the 
poetic play suits a woman any more than the 
sentence suits her. (134) 
From Beton's description of both content and structure 
we must realize that the e xis ting arca des and domes--
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landmarks of the literary landscape--prohibit access to 
women in the same way that the libraries and chapels at 
"Oxbridge" (11-12) or Cambridge do. Women who tried to 
build such monuments of their own found both the foundation 
and the construction shaky: "The whole structure, 
therefore, of the early nineteenth-century novel was 
raised, if one was a woman, by a mind which was slightly 
pulled from the straight, and made to alter its clear 
vision in deference to external authority" (129). The end 
result is inevitable: "Down comes her book upon our heads. 
There was a flaw in the centre of it" (129). As an 
alternative, says Beton, the woman writer must develop her 
own sentence, 24 and her own sequence, or "shape'' (132-36). 
Shifting terms from architectural to sexual, Beton suggests 
to her female audience that in the future of fiction, "the 
book has somehow to be adapted to the body, and at a 
venture one would say that women's books should be shorter, 
more concentrated, and framed so that they do not need long 
hours of steady and uninterrupted work" 25 (135). 
At another venture, one might superimpose Woolf's 
imagery onto Beton's narrative to construe this future 
shape. Might the architecture of this future book be a 
"room" in contrast to an arcade or cathedral, created by 
the woman whose lodgings and mind are "a room with g_ lock 
on the door" (186) [emphasis added] as opposed to a 
honeymoon suite? "Adapted to the body," might such a 
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"room" refer to female anatomy as well as mind, "the human 
frame being what it is, heart, body and brain all mixed 
together, and not contained in separate compartments" (30)? 
"A room of one's own" would thus be a space for sexual 
choice as well as intellectual freedom. 
Certainly such a reading would subvert the 
definitiveness of Mary Beton's "androgynous mind" metaphor. 
I believe, however, that such extrapolation is encouraged 
by the numerous parallels between the frame-story and the 
interior narrative. Although Woolf suggests a clear 
distinction between her voice and that of her persona/ 
protagonist, Mary Beton, she transgresses that distinction 
at the book's end. Following Mary's creation of the 
androgynous mind model, Woolf reappears to provide the 
closing comments: "Here, then, Mary Beton ceases to speak"; 
"I will end now in my own person" (182, 183). Yet during 
the peroration their voices coalesce, as Woolf claims 
arguments and anecdotes supposedly made by Mary Beton. For 
example, she states, "I told you in the course of this 
paper that Shakespeare had a sister" (197), when it was 
within Mary Beton's narrative that the story was told, and 
in Beton's voice. That Woolf appropriates Mary's story of 
the hypothetical Judith Shakespeare, endorses it as if it 
were fact, and extrapolates. it into a motivational myth 
(197-199) demonstrates the power of the outer frame to 
confirm and authorize the inner narrative. 26 The outer 
frame, however, may also qualify or undermine the inner 
frame. 
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Woolf repeatedly encourages the audience to be 
discriminating in giving their assent to the views 
expressed by Mary Beton, herself, or any such "one." In 
fact, both the narratives about, and of, Mary Beton result 
from Woolf's conviction that: 
when a subject [in this case Women and Fiction] 
is highly controversial-- and any question about 
sex is that- -one cannot hope to tell the truth. 
One can only show how one came to hold whatever 
opinion one does hold. One can only give one's 
audience the chance of drawing their own 
conclusions as they observe the limitations, the 
prejudices, the idiosyncrasies of the speaker. 
Fiction here 1s likely to contain more truth than 
fact. (5) 
Credibility is therefore a matter of access (to the 
speaker's circumstances and the factors which may bias her 
opinions) and assessment (measuring the degree to which the 
"truth" is refracted by such bias). To demonstrate the 
limitations of experience and view wrought by a patriarchal 
upbringing, Woolf creates Mary Beton, a fictional persona 
with circumstances remarkably similar to her own, whose 
opinions, we might presume, are likewise consistent with 
Woolf's. Both Woolf and Beton intermix facts and quotes 
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with fictional scenarios; both emphasize the impact of 
material circumstances on the production of fiction; both 
are wary of the male interloper, the patriarchal censor of 
"obscenity" in the persons of Sir Chartres Biron (141) or 
Archibald Bodkin (194); and both are insistent that their 
audience come to "think of things in themselves" (67, 193). 
They share similar turns of phrase, not even counting the 
anecdotes Woolf appropriates from Beton. They both also 
warn against the use of fiction for the sake of propaganda, 
whether the cause is justified or not. Still, we must 
remember that Woolf confirms only some of Mary Beton's 
conclusions, among them the need for a room of one's own 
and the importance of a literary tradition comprised of 
women. Conspicuously absent from that group is Beton's 
proposal of androgynous mind. When Mary Beton's narrative 
is finished, Woolf reminds us once again to consider her 
biases and read cautiously: 
While she has been doing all these things, you no 
doubt have been observing her failings and 
foibles and deciding what effect they have had on 
her opinions. You have been contradicting her 
and making whatever additions and deductions seem 
good to you. That is all as it should be, for in 
a question like this truth is only to be had by 
laying together many varieties of error. (183) 
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Of course, Beton's "failings and foibles" are revealed to 
us by Woolf; Woolf likewise orchestrates our observation of 
those flaws. I suggest, therefore, that when Woolf asserts 
that 11truth is only to be had by laying together many 
varieties of error," she refers not to a linear, side-by-
side laying together, but to an overlaying of concentric 
narrative frames, whereby each informs the other, but the 
outer frame, the voice from the margin, has the privilege 
of the first and final word. 
Beton explains the process of deriving meaning from 
novels as a dynamic between two such concentric frames, 
"life" and "shape 11 ; the dynamic she describes is similar to 
the relationship that exists between Woolf's and Beton's 
narratives: 
a novel starts in us all sorts of antagonistic 
and opposed emotions. Life conflicts with 
something that is not life. Hence the difficulty 
of coming to any agreement about novels, and the 
immense sway that our private prejudices have 
upon us. On the one hand, we feel You--John the 
hero--must live, or I shall be in the depths of 
despair. On the other, we feel, Alas, John, you 
must die, because the shape of the book requires 
it. Life conflicts with something that is not 
life. Then since life it is in part, we judge it 
as life. (125) 
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Like the frames represented by Woolf's autobiograph-
ical frame-story and Beton's fictional interior narrative, 
the outer frame of "life" and the interior frame of 
"shape," or "art," are inextricable. However, the outer 
frame has more authority; we judge the novel on its 
consistency with "life." 
It is significant that neither Woolf nor Beton 
disclaim or denigrate such judgement, although Woolf 
determines the natures of "life" and "reality" to be 
somewhat more abstract than they are traditionally supposed 
(respectively 198, and 191-92), and Beton conjectures that 
our understanding of "truth" is not necessarily based upon 
our own "life" experiences, but rather on "an inner light" 
or "premonition," "traced in invisible ink on the walls of 
the mind," by "Nature, in her most irrational mood" (125). 
This "premonition" parallels the "instinct" that prompts 
Beton to construe the heterosexual marriage and its sexual 
consummation as a basis for androgyny: "One has a profound, 
if irrational, instinct in favour of the theory that the 
union of man and woman makes for the greatest satisfaction, 
the most complete happiness" (170). That Beton 
characterizes the instinct that evokes her metaphor and the 
premonition which it confirms as "irrational" gives us 
cause to be wary. Notably, Woolf endorses neither the 
"natural" premonition, nor the heterosexual instinct in her 
peroration. In fact, she claims that: 
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when I rummage in my own mind I find no noble 
sentiments about being companions and equals and 
influencing the world to higher ends. I find 
myself saying briefly and prosaically that it is 
much more important to be oneself than anything 
else. (193) 
Later in her career Woolf emphatically denies the verity of 
arguments made from nature, and hence, the credibility of 
Nature as a basis for authority. She calls instead for a 
feminist revision of the conventional premises of truth, 
including Nature, that have been exploited by the 
patriarchy to perpetuate sexual and racial oppression. 
Woolf's call for feminist revision is most evident in Three 
Guineas, when she proposes an outsider's Society that would 
follow the suffragettes of the early nineteenth century in 
undertaking: 
endeavours of an experimental kind to discover 
what are the unwritten private laws; that is the 
laws that should regulate certain instincts, 
passions, mental and physical desires. That such 
laws exist and are observed by civil ized people 
is fairly generally allowed; but it is beginning 
to be agreed that they were not laid down by 
"God," who i s now very generally held to be a 
conception, of patriarchal origin, val i d only for 
c e rtain r a c e s, a t c erta in stage s a nd times; nor 
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by nature who is now known to vary greatly in her 
commands and to be largely under control; but 
have to be discovered afresh by successive 
generations, largely by their own efforts of 
reason and imagination. Since, however, reason 
and imagination are to some extent the product of 
our bodies, and there are two kinds of body, male 
and female, and since these two bodies have been 
proved within the past few years to differ 
fundamentally, it is clear that the laws that 
they perceive and respect must be differently 
interpreted. {185, note 42) 
While Three Guineas can be regarded as a feminist revision 
of the premises of "truth" that Mary Beton's androgynous 
mind metaphor takes for granted, I believe that Woolf's 
image of a room of one's own with a lock on the door is 
also such a revision, and provides the impetus for the 
model of female authority that the outsider's Society 
represents. 
We have learned in A Room of One's own that male and 
female writing, their respective "efforts of reason and 
imagination," do indeed take different "shapes," based on 
the "fundamental" differences between male and female 
bodies, and the consequential differences of experience, as 
bodies, that each incurs. Male writing derives both its 
form and its authority from the public institutions whose 
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ideals it expresses. Thus the domes and arcades of 
cathedrals and colleges are the shape of male writing; it 
is from within such institutions that the societal 
conventions, or "unwritten private laws," that regulate 
"certain instincts" (such as "chastity" and heterosexual 
bias) are established and inscribed. It is under the 
auspices of the church and the college that society at 
l arge receives these "unwritten laws," what Mary Beton 
calls "the perpetual admonitions of the eternal pedagogue" 
(130). Such are the words of God as transcribed by the 
bishop,27 and the designs of nature as delineated by the 
professors. The authority of male discourse is effected by 
writing within conventions readily accessible to other 
Fellows or members, and is retained by excluding others 
from knowledge of those convent ions, while simultaneously 
using the privilege of voice to deny outsiders (women, the 
working class, and colonial natives) the means to establish 
their own conventions.28 
Mary Beton recognizes the effectiveness of such 
exclusion, and that a woman had to be "stalwart" to persist 
in writing anyway: 
one must have been something of a firebrand to say 
to oneself, Oh but they can't buy literature too. 
Literature is open to everybody. I refuse to 
allow you, Beadle though you are, to turn me off 
t h e gras s. Lock up your librarie s if you like ; 
but there is no gate, no lock, no bolt that you 
can set upon the freedom of my mind. {131) 
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What Beton seems less cognizant of, however, is the 
infiltration of patriarchal bias into even the economical l y 
independent woman writer's psyche. Her own metaphor of 
androgynous mind is compromised by such bias, most notably 
in her injunction that "If one is a man, still the woman 
part of the brain must have effect; and a woman also must 
have intercourse with the man in her" (170). The reader 
must recognize that it would be oppressive to the woman 
writer if even in the mind, that "room of one's own," the 
female muse were required to be accompanied by a Fellow, 
moreover to copulate with him, in order to communicate with 
her audience. 
We must realize, however, that "androgyny" is a model 
for authority that attempts to communicate with an audience 
of both men and women. Mary Beton claims about the novels 
of Galsworthy and Ki p l ing that "some of the finest works of 
our greatest living writers fal l upon deaf ears. Do what 
she will a woman cannot f i nd in them that fountain of 
perpetual life which the critics assure her is there" 
(177). In this claim, she reveals that the lack of 
communication only occurs across genders, that the male 
critics accord these works by male writers the authority 
that comes of following traditional conventions. What she 
does not consider, (that I argue Woolf does,) is tha t women 
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might write to a female audience only, an audience that may 
not discount righteous indignation as legitimate content 
for fiction nor display shock because Chloe "liked" Olivia. 
Unlike the persona Mary Beton, Virginia Woolf sees the 
threat of patriarchal imposition clearly; to the image of a 
"room of one's own," that represents "freedom of mind" to 
Beton, she adds a lock on the door (186). While the 
patriarchal "you" can not put a lock on the woman writer's 
freedom of mind, a self-installed lock of a different type 
can prohibit his access to her. This lock does not 
restrict her mind from venturing forth outside its room; in 
fact, her creative energies can no longer be contained by 
the rooms she has heretofore been confined to: 
For women have sat indoors all these millions of 
years, so that by this time the very walls are 
permeated by their creative force, which has, 
indeed, so overcharged the capacity of bricks and 
mortar that it must needs harness itself to pens 
and brushes and business and politics. (152) 
Nor does this lock maintain public propriety and privilege, 
as do those at college, chapel, and cathedral; instead it 
ensures both intellectual and sexual self-determination. 
It is from such a room with a lock on the door that Woolf 
suggests female authority derives, and from such a room 
that the body, whose experiences must be told, and the mind 
that shall communicate those experiences, are to remain 
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free from sexual and psychological imposition by the male. 
I suggest once again, on the basis of an interpolation of 
Woolf's imagery into Beton's narrative, and on the basis of 
both the explicit and implicit contrast to the 
institutional shape of male writing, that the shape of 
women's writing--its sexual, textual, and intellectual 
metaphor--is a room of one's own with a lock on the door. 
CHAPTER III 
"ANDROGYNY " AND THE DUPLICITOUS NARRATOR 
What we understand about the relationship between 
androgyny, a room of one's own, and the prospects for 
female authority depends on how we read Mary Beton. Before 
giving her voice, Woolf calls on us to question her 
credibility, to draw our own conclusions, to "observe the 
limitations, the prejudices, the idiosyncrasies of the 
speaker" (5). Moreover, she cautions us that as she mouths 
Beton's words, "Lies will flow from my lips, but there may 
perhaps be some truth mixed up with them; it is for you to 
seek out this truth and to decide whether any part of it is 
worth keeping" (6). Beginning, then, with a sort of liar's 
paradox to beguile rather than guide us, we must find a 
criteria by which to gauge credibility, to discern the 
"truth" from the "lie." I have proposed a process of 
confirmation and corroboration, where, by virtue of a 
narrative frame, Woolf resists implication in Beton's 
"lies" but concurs with her evocation of "truth." 
However, to refer Beton's entire discourse to the 
conclusions Woolf derives from it would be extremely 
reductive. Nor could Woolf's conclusions sta nd on thei r 
own without the substantiation that Beton's investigation 
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provides. The vast majority of Beton's own conclusions 
follow from reasoned argument; those that seem untenable 
are most often patently facetious. Consider, for example, 
her tentative adoption of the argument against allowing the 
"protected sex 11 access to previously male employment: 
Remove that protect i on, expose them to the same 
exertions and activities, make them soldiers and 
sailors and engine-drivers and dock-labourers, 
and will women not die off so much younger, so 
much quicker than men that one will say, 11 I saw a 
woman today," as one used to say, "I saw an 
aeroplane." (69) 
Notably, she does not suggest, "make her a barrister, a 
bishop, a professor, or a judge," and thereby ironizes the 
argument by the exception of those "protected professions." 
Beton must also be aware that women did serve as ambulance 
drivers, nurses, and laborers during the war. More 
telling, in terms of her later metaphor for androgyny, is 
her awareness of the hardships women have endured even as 
"the protected sex": the wife- and daughter-beating that 
were the recognized right of the patriarch during the 
Elizabethan era (72-73); the bearing and care of children 
throughout the ages, but particularly during the Victorian 
era, when a Mrs. Seton might have "thirteen children by a 
minister of the church" (35); and the demeaning personal 
servitude by which women prior to 1918 had to make their 
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livings (64) if they wished to avoid the sexual servitude 
of marriage. Also apparently facetious is Beton's blame of 
the suffragists for the misogyny of contemporary male 
writing. However, Beton's position on this issue is a bit 
more complex, for she does not explicitly counter her claim 
elsewhere: 
No age can ever have been as stridently sex-
conscious as our own; those innumerable books by 
men about women in the British Museum are a proof 
of it. The Suffrage campaign was no doubt to 
blame. It must have roused in men an 
extraordinary desire for self-assertion; it must 
have made them lay an emphasis upon their own sex 
and its characteristics which they would not have 
troubled to think about had they not been 
challenged. (172) 
Descrying the effects of this sex-consciousness in the work 
of the hypothetical Mr. A--"He is protesting against the 
equality of the other sex by asserting his own superiority" 
--Beton continues to place the blame on the feminist 
agitators: 
He is therefore impeded and inhibited and self-
conscious as Shakespeare might have been too had 
he known Miss Clough and Miss Davies. Doubtless 
Elizabe than literature would h a v e bee n v ery 
different from what it is if the women's movement 
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had begun in the sixteenth century and not the 
nineteenth. (175-76) 
We have been encouraged, even conditioned by both Beton and 
Woolf to respond "But," at junctures such as these. For 
Beton has already exonerated that representative feminist, 
Miss Emily Davies, whose research makes possible in part 
Beton's own argument (115), and whose successful endeavor 
to gain women the vote allows Beton to advocate provisions 
for women's authority that depend upon women retaining 
their rights to own property and earn money. On the other 
hand, Beton has discredited the male insistence that women 
are inherently inferior as an "illusion" of disproportion--
"Women have served all these centuries as looking-glasses 
possessing the magic and delicious power of reflecting the 
figure of man at twi ce its natural size" (60)--of dubious 
value to "civilized societies" but "essential to all 
violent and heroic action" (61). Hence we might conclude 
that the sex-conscious protests of women of that era are 
based on truth and j ustified, whereas those of their male 
contemporaries insist upon an illusion, are unjust and 
invalid. However, Beton's closing comments assert 
unequivocably that the first sentence she would write for 
"her" lecture on Women and Fiction would be "it is fatal 
for any one who writes to think of their sex." Furthermore, 
she woul d add: 
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It is fatal to be a man or woman pure and simple; 
one must be woman-manly or man-womanly. It is 
fatal for a woman to lay the least stress on any 
grievance; to plead even with justice any cause; 
in any way to speak consciously as a woman. 
(181) 
This is an instance where we must find recourse in the 
authority of the outer frame. If Beton is indeed Woolf's 
retrojected self (5) , the end of her investigation, 
analysis, and conjecture refers us back to the beginning of 
Woolf's lecture. There has, it seems, been a great deal of 
revision between the first sentences Beton drafts for this 
talk on Women and Fiction, and the first words Woolf utters 
as she addresses her audience: "But, you may say, we asked 
you to speak on women and fiction--what has a room of one's 
own to do with that?" (3). This recursive ploy reasserts 
the primacy of the metaphor of "a room of one's own" and 
suggests that "androgyny" is at best a tentative answer to 
women's attainment of narrative authority, dismissed upon 
reflection; at worst, it implies a retraction by Beton of 
her heretofore feminist rhetoric, a concession to the 
patriarchs that hide behind curtains (159), infiltrating 
women's rooms, impinging upon their consciousnesses, and 
imposing both demands and strictures upon their bodies. 
There remains the supposition that Shakespeare's plays 
would have been stifled had the consciousness-raising of 
64 
those early feminists taken place three centuries earlier. 
Beton and Woolf rationalize that possibility in like 
manner. For if women had enjoyed the freedoms--won largely 
through the efforts of such agitators--three hundred years 
earlier, then the "masterpieces," which "are not single and 
solitary births," but "the outcome of many years of 
thinking in common, of thinking by the body of the people, 
so that the experience of the mass is behind the single 
voice" (113), woul d have already found their voice in some 
Mary Carmichael, whom, even given the exaggerated sex-
consciousness of the Modern era, "wi ll be a poet ... in 
another hundred years' time" (164). Likewise, Judith 
Shakespeare would have "put on the body which she has so 
often laid down" over a century ago; although without that 
additional three hundred years of freedom that a room of 
one's own represents--privacy, economic independence, 
sexual autonomy--we must wait "another century or so" (198) 
for her resurrection. The "masterpieces" of William 
Shakespeare--made possible by the general populace's 
unquestioning acceptance of male privilege--may have been 
lost, but they would have been replaced by the masterpieces 
of a Judi th Shakespeare who required freedom rather than 
privilege. 
In the previous instances, we have seen how the 
narrative frames enci rcling Wool f and Beton interact to 
suggest a truth beyond simple statement and assertion--
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Beton's narrative informing and proposing, Woolf's 
frame confirming and qualifying. We should also consider 
that while Woolf's conclusions depend upon Mary Beton's 
endeavors, Mary Beton's narrative does not require Woolf's 
(aside from the a priori creation of Beton herself). This 
distinction is important for two reasons. First, it 
underscores Woolf's rhetorical strategy of deferring 
conclusions, placing the burden of proof upon Beton and 
the challenge of analysis on her audience. Second, it 
indicates that Beton has a subversive project of her own, 
for she often discredits her own conventional suppositions, 
independent of Woolf's voice-over--generally, by 
contextualizing them. As we shall see, she is not simply 
Woolf's dupe or a daughter of the patriarchy. 
What I mean by "deferred conclusion" is demonstrated 
best by Woolf's interpretation of the topic "Women and 
Fiction," and her subsequent disclaimer that "she should 
never be able to come to a conclusion," she "should never 
be able to fulfill ... the first duty of a lecturer--to hand 
you after an hour's discourse a nugget of pure truth" (4). 
Yet as soon as she substitutes for that formidable 
responsibility "an opinion upon one minor point--a woman 
must have money and a room of her own if she is to write 
fiction" (4), she creates and authorizes Mary Beton to 
compress into that metaphor connotations and contexts that 
address the topic as she first interpreted it: 
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The title women and fiction might mean, and you 
may have meant it to mean, women and what they 
are like; or it might mean women and the fiction 
that they write; or it might mean women and the 
fiction that is written about them; or it might 
mean that somehow all three are inextricably 
mixed together and you want me to consider them 
in that light. (3-4) 
When in her peroration Woolf reiterates the need for a room 
of one's own, it fuses all those considerations into its 
"truth." The metaphor "a room of one's own" is our nugget 
of pure truth, but we have had to mine it from layers of 
assertion and qualification. 
Beton too employs the strategy of deferring 
conclusions to the questions that inform her own discourse. 
As practical matters impinge upon her contemplation--she 
may not enter the library at Oxbridge, she has missed the 
turn to Fernham--the respective questions, "what is style 
and what is meaning?" (11), and "which is the truth and 
which is the illusion?" (25) are apparently abandoned. Yet 
these question reemerge periodically, the terms gaining 
significance as they are defined in new contexts. 
In its original context, the question, "what is style 
and what is meaning?" is prompted by Beton's consideration 
of "the affectation of style" in Thackeray's Esmond, "with 
its imitation of the eighteenth century." Such style can 
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only be effectual if it is indeed "natural to Thackeray" 
and in the service of "sense" rather than for the sake of 
"style" itself, Beton suggests (11). Later Beton applies 
the same standard to women's narrative style, particularly 
its "sequence," in her reading of Mary Carmichael's first 
novel: 
she had gone further and broken the sequence--the 
expected order. Perhaps she had done this 
unconsciously, merely giving things their natural 
order, as a woman would, if she wrote like a 
woman. But the effect was somehow baffling; one 
could not see a wave heaping itself, a crisis 
coming round the next corner. (159) 
The implication here, that woman's "natural" sequence may 
not be the same as the masculine order--"the wave heaping," 
the readily anticipated climax--is confirmed later in 
Beton's investigation, as she shows the sensibility and the 
sequence of "the finest works of our greatest living 
writers" to be inimical to women: 
the emotion with which these books are permeated 
is to a woman incomprehensible. It is coming, it 
is gathering, it is about to burst on one's head, 
one begins saying long before the end ... But one 
will rush away before that happens and hide in 
the goosebe rry bushes ... (178) 
68 
As Beton cites this reaction with regard to "Mr. Kipling's 
officers who turn their backs ; and his Sowers who sow the 
Seed, 11 and elaborates that such figures in contemporary 
male novels make the woman reader feel as if she "had been 
caught eavesdropping at some purely masculine orgy" (178), 
she reinforces the idea that male sequence reflects male 
sexuality as it expresses male sensibility. For that 
reason women must reject such order, replacing it with a 
sequence consistent with their own experience. To arrive 
at this conclusion, however, Beton has to foresake her 
conventional expectations: 
whenever I was about to feel the usual things in 
the usual places, about love, about death, the 
annoying creature twitched me away, as if the 
important point were just a little further on. 
And thus she made it impossible for me to roll out 
my sonorous phrases about "elemental feelings," 
the "common stuff of humanity," "the depths of the 
human heart," and all those other phrases that 
support us in our belief that, however clever we 
may be on top, we are very serious, very profound 
and very humane underneath. She made me feel, on 
the contrary, that instead of being serious and 
profound and humane, one might be--and the thought 
was far less seductive--merely lazy minded and 
conventional into the bargain. (159-60) 
69 
These critical cliches describe a literature masculine in 
both style and sense. The "integrity" between the style 
of such literature and its sense is masculine also. When 
Beton explains, "What one means by integrity, in the case 
of the novelist, is the conviction he gives one that this 
is the truth" (125), she purposefully uses the male 
pronoun. She also makes it clear, by contrast, that such 
"truth" does not have a basis in the experience of the 
feminine "one": "one feels, I should never have thought 
that this couid be so; I have never known people behaving 
like that" (125). The fact that women affirm this "truth," 
despite their own experience--"Yes .•. you have convinced me 
so it is, so it happens"--is a testament to the power of 
culturally conditioned "instinct" and "desire" (126). 
Beton's concept of "integrity" also brings to bear the 
question she had grappled with on her way to Fernham, 
" which was the truth and which was illusion?" Although her 
contemplation is disrupted and she supplies no immediate 
answer (25), our understanding of "integrity" as a 
conviction of "truth" requires at least a tentative answer 
to that question. 
As before, Beton's question is prompted by a 
consideration of literary merit, and again she poses it in 
terms of the impact of one's era on such evaluations. 
After praising the poetry of Alf.red Lord Tennyson and 
70 
Christina Rossetti for epitomizing the romantic sentiments 
shared between the sexes before the Modern age, she 
continues to contemplate: 
I went on to wonder if honestly one could name 
two living poets now as great as Tennyson and 
Rossetti were then. Obviously, it is impossible, 
I thought, to compare them. The very reason why 
that poetry excites one to such abandonment, such 
rapture, is that it celebrates some feeling that 
one used to have ... so that one responds easily, 
familiarly, without troubling to check the 
feeling, or compare it to any one has now. But 
the living poets express a feeling that is 
actually being made and torn out of us at the 
moment. (23) 
Beton's reflection itself challenges such abandonment, for 
she does check the feeling. What she finds as the basis 
for her affirmation is nostalgia. We learn, moreover, that 
the "feeling one used to have" was based on "illusion": 
Shall we lay blame on the war? When the guns 
fired in August 1914, did the faces of men and 
women show so plain in each other's eyes that 
romance was killed? Certainly it was a shock (to 
women in particular with thei r illusions about 
education and so on) to see the faces of our 
rulers in the light of the shell fire. So ugly 
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they looked--German, English, French--so 
stupid ... But why say "blame"? Why, if it was an 
illusion, not praise the catastrophe, whatever i t 
was, that destroyed illusion and put truth in i ts 
place? For truth ... (25) 
Her contemplation of literature and relations between the 
sexes is temporarily interrupted by missing the turn to 
Fernham; back on course, Beton resumes her inquiry by 
restating her question, "which was the truth and which was 
illusion?" to interrogate her apprehension of her 
environment as well. Although she drops this question 
wi thout providing a pat answer, ·her narrative points out 
that other illusions about the sexes--the illusion held 
"all these centuries" that women are inherently inferior to 
men (60-62), the illusion that education modifies male 
savagery (65), the illusion that chastity is an instinct 
for women (86-87)--underlie the "truth" we read in 
canoni zed l iterature. Literature is in col lusion with 
Nature and education to keep relations between the sexes 
status quo, for literature provides the stories--women in 
relation to men only--while Nature, (we have been educated 
to believe) trace s patriarchal "premonitions'' on the walls 
of the mind (125) and instil l s in us instincts, such as 
"the uni on of man and woman makes for the greate st 
s a tis f action, the mos t comple t e ha ppiness" (170). Again, 
the integri ty of these works, their authority, is a 
correspondence between socially-conditioned instinct and 
generally-accepted illusions. As we have seen in Beton's 
initial reaction to Mary Carmichael's novel, failing to 
check such feelings leads one to accept and expect the 
conventional, thus perpetuating the illusions about the 
sexes that sustain it. 
By deferring her queries about women and fiction 
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to first consider apparently innocuous questions of the 
impact of an age on discriminations of literary merit, 
Beton calls upon the Modern prejudice against the 
conventional to establish support for her subsequent and 
parallel claims regarding the impact of one's sex on such 
deliberations. She can be assured that the objection, "But 
Tennyson and Rosetti are clearly not superior to Eliot or 
Yeats" will be forthcoming, as will the agreement, 
"certainly one should not affect an outdated style to 
express the sensibility of the present." Yet she can not 
be so sure that an audience other than women will grant 
that Mr. A is not superior to Mary Carmichael, or that 
women should not affect masculine style to express their 
sensibility. 
In the event that we do not perceive the 
correspondence between one's era and one's sex in making 
assessments of literature's "truth" and "meaning," we can 
recall Beton's previous example, regarding the same 
variables as they affect judgements about the worth of 
various professions: 
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Is the charwoman who has brought up eight 
children of less value to the world than the 
barrister who has made a hundred thousand pounds? 
It is useless to ask such questions; for nobody 
can answer them. Not only do the comparative 
values of charwomen and lawyers rise and fall 
from decade to decade, but we have no rods with 
which to measure them even as they are at the 
moment. I had been foolish to ask my professor 
to provide me with "indisputable proofs" of this 
or that in his argument about women. Even if one 
could state the value of any one gift at the 
moment, those values will change; in a century's 
time very possibly they will have changed 
completely. (69) 
Beton's argument claims that the value of women and men and 
what they do are relative to the age as well as to each 
other, that changes in time bring changes in status. Yet 
we have seen that there are valuations--"illusions"--that 
persist for centuries, just as there are 11professors" who 
think they have the measuring rods (153). Beton shows us 
that literature has played, and still plays, an essential 
and reciprocal role in maintaining the authori ty of both. 
Moreover, such authority had become so entrenched that it 
took world war to disillus i on both women and men . 
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In the foregoing instances, I have attempted to 
illustrate that, Woolf's intervention aside, Beton 
qualifies her own characterization of androgyny, causing us 
to question its desirability. She shows us that a lack of 
sex-consciousness may be the product of privilege or a 
complacent acceptance of " illusion," resulting in the 
promulgation of misbegotten "truths." Similarly, the 
authority or "integrity" of the vision an androgynous mind 
manifests may be no more than a confirmation of the 
reader's pre-conditioned expectations. 
Finally, the argument can be made that Beton's concept 
of androgyny is meant to counteract specifically the 
sex-conscious misogyny of contemporary male writing, a 
contingency that would perhaps facilitate women's pursuit 
of the alternate provisions for women's authority Beton 
establ ished in the first five chapters--a room of one's 
own, a tradition of women writers, and a sentence, 
sequence , and style consistent with women 's experience. 
After providing her first "sketch" of the androgynous 
mind--ending with the injunction, "If one is man, still the 
woman must have effect; and a woman also must have 
intercourse with the man in her" (170), Beton conjectures, 
"Perhaps a mind that is purely masculine cannot create any 
more than a mind that is purely feminine" (171), and 
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proposes "it would be well to test what one meant by man-
womanly, and conversely by woman-manly, by pausing and 
looking at a book or two" (171). Yet despite what she 
conjectures and proposes, the books she examines are all by 
men, and they illustrate only the dangers of the purely 
masculine mind. Indeed, in the previous chapter, Beton's 
critique of the work of Mary Carmichael as representative 
of contemporary women's writing noted in particular its 
lack of sex-consciousness, due largely to the fact that she 
has a room of her own (164). 
The first book Beton looks at is a new novel by Mr. A, 
who is "protesting against the equality of the other sex by 
asserting his own ~uperiority" (175). Hi s narrator is a 
self-assertive "I," "a straight dark bar," ''a shadow across 
the page" that keeps us from distinguishing what lies 
behind it. More disconcerting, however, is that his 
protest takes on connotations of rape. We share Beton's 
reading of a scene from Mr. A's book: 
she has not a bone in her body, I thought 
watching Phoebe, for that was her name, coming 
across the beach. Then Alan got up and the 
shadow of Alan at once obliterated Phoebe. For 
Alan had views and Phoebe was quenched in the 
flood of his views. And then Alan, I thought, 
has passions; and here I turned page after page 
very fast, feeling that the crisis was 
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approaching, and so it was. It took place on the 
beach under the sun. It was done very openly . 
It was done very vigorously. Nothing could have 
been more indecent. (174) 
Although this scene may not be explicitly or overtly a 
rape--the 11 it, 11 the crisi s alluded to unspecified, perhaps 
unment ionable--the obliteration of Phoebe, the passion of 
Alan, and the open and vigorous and indecent act that 
culminates their relationship suggest to me a subjugation 
of that nature. If so, it is a rape that author, narrator, 
and character alike col lude in , a scene inscribed on the 
mind's eye by the masculine 11 1" as a warning. Yet rather 
than revile Mr. A for the aggression of his book, she 
recalls the idealized relations between the sexes in the 
poetry of Tennyson and Christina Rosetti (175) and blames 
the suffragists for making 11virility" 11 self-conscious" 
(176). 
Mr. A's book is not, however, an isolated instance. 
Both its sentiment and the sequence of its plot are 
typical, suggests Beton, as she parodies the purely 
masculine climax in the novels of Galsworthy and Kipling. 
Although I have quoted part of this passage before, I cite 
it here more fully. Note in particular the exaggerated 
imagery, for i t is specifically this imagery that is 
modified in Beton's descr ipti on of the consummation of 
opposites in the "androgynous" mind. 
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It is coming, it is gathering, it is about to 
burst on one's head, one begins saying long 
before the end. That picture will fall on old 
Jolyon•s head; he will die of the shock; the old 
clerk will speak over him two or three obituary 
words; and all the swans on the Thames will 
simultaneously burst out singing. But one will 
rush away before that happens and hide in the 
gooseberry bushes ... (177) 
While we have seen that women would be well advised to 
"rush away before that happens," Beton once again suggests 
that women have brought this upon themselves: 
All seducers and reformers are responsible. Lady 
Bessborough when she lied to Lord Granville; Miss 
Davies when she told the truth to Mr. Greg. All 
who have brought about a state of sex-
consciousness are to blame, and it is they who 
drive me, when I want to stretch my facu l ties on 
a book, to seek it in that happy age before Miss 
Clough and Miss Davies were born, when the writer 
used both sides of his mind equally. One must 
turn back to Shakespeare then, for Shakespeare 
was androgynous; and so was Keats and Sterne and 
Cowper and Lamb and Coleridge ... (180) 
The list of these androgynous writers goe s on, and al l o f 
them are male. By now, we should be aware that something 
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is awry. To what "happy age" does she refer, we might 
wonder, since she spent more than a chapter detailing the 
hardships women endured in the Elizabethan era. Moreover, 
she previously attributed the sex-consciousness of the 
Modern age to the war; certainly Miss Davies did not start 
that. Other objections may be raised on the basis of the 
disproportionate relationship between the sexes in those 
pre-sex-conscious times: 
Women have served all these centuries as looking-
glasses possessing the magic and delicious power 
of reflecting the figure of man at twice its 
natural size. Without that power probably the 
earth would still be swamp and jungle. The 
glories of all our wars would be unknown .•. 
Supermen and Fingers of Destiny would never have 
existed. The Czar and the Kaiser would never 
have worn their crowns or lost them. Whatever 
may be their use in civilized societies, mirrors 
are essential to all violent and heroic action. 
That is why Napoleon and Mussolini insist so 
emphatically upon the inferiority of women, for 
if they were not inferior, they would cease to 
enlarge. (60-61) 
We must therefore ask ourselves, as Beton professes her 
nostalgia for the literature of the past, whether a return 
to pre-war illusions would really rectify the "unmitigated 
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masculinity" evident in Fascist Italy (179) or the "self-
assertive masculinity" imminent in England. or, we might 
ask if the sensibility imploring the "development by the 
average woman of a prose style completely expressive of her 
mind" (165) is really as threatening as that motivating the 
consortiums of men convened "to develop the Italian novel" 
and the "Fascist poem" (179). Having pointed out that 
there was a misogynist Napoleon before there was the 
misogynist Mussolini, Beton seems to indicate that women 
can neither relate to men as inferiors or as equals without 
"causing" them to become despots or rapists. 
In addition to blaming the suffragists for male sex-
consciousness, as if their actions were reprehensibl e, and 
waxing nostalgic over poetry that ideal ized the 
relationship between the sexes, Beton ra i ses up an all-male 
"androgynous" tradition as an example contemporary wr i ters 
should emulate. Notably, the tone of these arguments seems 
to be conciliatory toward men and the patriarchal literary 
tradition. They are, however, a prelude to Beton's final 
pitch for "androgyny," which she claims she would write at 
the very beginning of her paper on "Women and Fiction." 
Yet in terms of arguments Beton has made earlier, 
"androgyny" does not make sense as an alternative for women 
writers to adopt, especially considering that their sex-
consciousness has b een almost erad i cate d a s a r e sul t of 
having rooms of their own, and that the metaphor for 
androgyny would reconstruct in the consciousness the very 
relationship that has oppressed women for centuries. 
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The explanation that "androgyny" is directed 
specifically toward men, under the guise of a sexually-
indiscriminate argument, is the most logical conclusion to 
be drawn from the argument as Beton has presented it. 
Thus, despite the fact that Beton is writing for an 
audience of college women, her exhortation addresses a male 
writer: 
Some collaboration has to take place in the mind 
between the woman and the man before the act of 
creation can be accomplished. Some marriage of 
opposites has to be consummated. The whole of 
the mind must lie wide open if we are to get the 
sense that the writer is communicating his 
experience with perfect fullness. There must be 
freedom and there must be peace. Not a wheel 
must grate, not a light glimmer. The curtains 
must be close drawn. The writer, I thought, once 
his experience is over, must lie back and let his 
mind celebrate its nuptials in darkness. He must 
not look or question what is being done. Rather, 
he must pluck the petals from a rose or watch the 
swans float calmly down the river. (182) 
While there is cause to wonder why the wri ter must not look 
at what is being done, there is even more cause to wonder 
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why Beton has chosen to use a male writer to exemplify this 
dynamic of "androgyny" in a paper on the topic of "Women 
and Fiction." The imagery of Beton's metaphor provides 
another indication that it is intended specifically to 
redress male sex-consciousness. Thus we might note that 
the swans floating calmly down the river are a direct 
contrast to the imagery used to characterize the climax of 
"purely masculine" novels by contemporary male writers, 
wherein "all the swans on the Thames will simultaneously 
burst out singing" (177) to mark the death of some great 
man. In addition, the image of the closed curtains 
contrasts directly with a scene from Mary Carmichael's 
book, which Beton notes parenthetically while concluding 
her discussion of the importance of "a room of one's own": 
Give her another hundred years, I concluded, 
reading the last chapter--people's noses and bare 
shoulders showed naked against a starry sky, for 
some one had twitched the curtain in the drawing 
room--give her a room of her own and five hundred 
a year... (164) 
The significance of such imagery is further established 
with reference to Beton's claim about the importance of her 
inheritance in dissipating her own sex-consciousness: 
"Indeed my aunt's legacy unveiled the sky to me, and 
substituted for the large and imposing figure of a 
gentleman, which Milton recommended for my perpetual 
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adoration, a view of the open sky" (67). since such a view 
is clearly associated with women's ability to express 
themselves in both instances, and is also associated with 
the economic independence that "a room of one's own" 
represents, the contrast of such imagery to that used in 
Beton's metaphor for "androgyny" is another indication that 
"androgyny" is not applicable to women. On the other hand, 
the contrast of the swan imagery i n this metaphor to 
imagery that characterizes male sex-consciousness, suggests 
that "androgyny" is a metaphor directed toward men. 
In this chapter, I have sought to establish the ways 
in which Beton herself undermines "androgyny" as a viable 
perspective for women writers to adopt. As I suggested in 
the first chapter, the misogyny of contemporary male 
writers, that "force in things which one had overlooked" 
motivates this abrupt change in the focus of her discourse. 
CONCLUSION 
In the foregoing chapters, I have sought to elucidate the 
rhetorical strategy of A Room on One's own as proof that, 
contrary to the prevailing critical view, Woolf did not 
advocate "androgyny" as a perspective that women writers 
should cultivate in order to effect authority. 
One aspect of that strategy is Woolf's creation of a 
fictional persona to re-enact the process whi ch led her to 
claim "a woman must have money and a room of her own if she 
is to write fiction" (4), as the thesis of her lecture on 
"Women and Fiction." Under that pretext, Mary Beton 
investigates women's authority in a variety of contexts 
that establish "a room of one's own" as a metaphor for such 
authority and provide it with its connotations of economic 
independence, intellectual freedom, and sexual autonomy. 
By the end of chapter five, she reaches the conclusion with 
which Woolf began her lecture, thus presumably fulfilling 
her rhetorical purpose. However, instead of referring us 
back to Woolf's discourse, Beton begins the final chapter 
by proposing that both women and men should adopt an 
androgynous perspective in order to write l iterature. 
It is that portion of Beton's narrative that has led to the 
impression that Woolf is a proponent of androgyny . 
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However, the sexual imperative and patriarchal ideology 
that Beton incorporates within her metaphor for such a 
perspective make it contradictory to the imagery and 
implications of "a room of one's own," which Beton 
establishes in the first five chapters. I have argued that 
Woolf circumscribes Beton within a narrative frame, 
specifically so that she can illustrate the biases and 
limitations of a perspective that would have been imposed 
on a woman of her class and generation, and yet reject 
those prejudices. Woolf clearly warns us to look for such 
bias before giving Beton voice (5), and reminds us of them 
again before resuming the argument for "a room of one's 
own" in her own person (183). Thus, while she corroborates 
the provisions for women's authority that Beton develops in 
conjunction with the "room of one's own" metaphor, she 
excludes "androgyny" from her own recommendations, making 
no reference to it in either the introduction or the 
conclusion. 
Another aspect of the rhetorical strategy of ~ Room of 
one's Own that subverts the utility of "androgyny" as an 
approach to women's authority is the duplicity of Beton's 
own narrative. While there are numerous instances of this 
duplicity, I have noted in particular how Beton makes a 
universal argument for "androgyny" in order to redress 
specifically the sex-consciousness of men. She has already 
shown in the previous chapter that the contemporary woman 
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writer has lost her sex-consciousness, largely as a result 
of having "a room of her own"; indeed, in the section on 
"androgyny" all of the examples of sex-consciousness that 
she cites are from the writing of men. In addition, the 
"androgynous" tradition she holds up as an example to 
modern writers is made up of male writers only, and her 
projection of the form that "androgyny" would take uses a 
male writer as its example (even though her paper is 
supposedly on "Women and Fiction"). Thus when she 
justifies her metaphor on the grounds that "No age can ever 
have been as stridently sex-conscious as our own" (172), 
she refers in particular to male sex-consciousness. This 
makes sense in light of the fact that women's circumstances 
were generally improved following World War I and the 
Suffrage movement, while men lost some of the privilege 
they had taken for granted previously. I have suggested 
that Beton's duplicity is prompted by her awareness of the 
repercussions that her more radical proposals for women's 
authority might entail, as indicated by the misogyny of 
Modern male writing, the rise of Fascist sentiment (also 
misogynist), and the recent censorship of Radclyffe Hall's 
novel, The Well of Loneliness, for its lesbian content. 
In the introduction to this thesis, I suggested that 
the importance of excluding "androgyny" from Woolf's 
provisions for women's authority had to do with the nature 
of the criticism of both her fiction and theory that is 
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derived from that premise. Those that accept "androgyny" 
as a credible alternative for the woman artist's 
empowerment generally reconstruct the masculine bias of 
that metaphor, as demonstrated by the cited readings of To 
the Lighthouse by Carolyn Heilbrun and Ellen Tremper. on 
the other hand, those that recognize that "androgyny" is a 
detrimental model for women to emulate and yet believe 
Woolf endorsed that model, usually characterize Woolf's 
feminist theory as flawed or compromised, as suggested by 
the critiques of Showalter and Farwell. If we agree, as 
most feminist critics do, that "we think back through our 
mothers if we are women" (132), then women critics as well 
as women novelists must think back through Woolf. 
NOTES 
1 From here on, I designate "a room of one's own" and 
"androgyny" as metaphors or models for women's authority by 
placing them within quotation marks. 
2 The essays that deal with A Room of One's own as a 
primary text are chapter four, "Liberty, Sorority, 
Mis ogyny" ; chapter seven, 11Taking the Bull by the Udders: 
Sexual Difference in Virginia Woolf- -A Conspiracy Theory"; 
and chapter eight, 11 Sapphistry: Narration as Lesbian 
Seduction in A Room of One's own." However, [1 Room of 
One's Own is referred to frequently in the other essays 
also. 
3 In fact, Marcus considers Woolf's substitution of the 
Mary persona (with its respective manifestations as Mary 
Beton, Mary seton, and Mary carmichael) for the self-
assertive "I" typically found in male discourse to be part 
of a rhetorical strategy of collaboration and 
inclusiveness, rather than a tactic to separate Woolf from 
the views expressed by Beton (145-50). I agree that the 
sense of the text as a whole is effected by the 
collaboration between Woolf and the narrator/persona, Mary 
Beton, but I believe that part of Woolf's project in A Room 
of One's own is to show how insidious patriarchal bias is, 
and how women are persuaded to acknowledge the patriarchal 
values that oppress them. I argue that Woolf achieves this 
end by having Beton embody these biases and later discard 
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them or reveal their inadequacy with regard to women. 
However, Beton's proposal of "androgyny" is a relapse into 
such bias, and is prompted by her awareness of the 
masculine backlash against the freedoms women gained in the 
decades around the turn of the century. 
4 Woolf provides a more thorough explanation in the notes 
to Three Guineas, as follows: "Our ideol ogy is still so 
inveterately anthropocentric that it has been necessary to 
coin this clumsy term--educated man's daughter--to describe 
the class whose fathers have been educated at public 
schools and universities. Obviously, if the term 
'bourgeois' fits her brother, it is grossly incorrect to 
use it of one who differs so profoundly in the two prime 
characteristics of the bourgeois--capital and environment" 
(146, note 2). In accordance with this description, Beton 
is clearly an "educated man's daughter." 
5 Heilbrun later recants her support of androgyny as an 
interpretive construct, and provides a new reading of To 
the Lighthouse that makes no reference to androgyny in 
"To the Lighthouse: the New Story of Mother and Daughter" 
ADE-Bulletin. New York, NY (ADEB). 1987 Fall, 87: 12-14. 
6 The pretexts and dates of these essays are as follows: 
"Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown" (1924), refutes Arnold 
Bennett's claim that Modern writers do not create 
characters tha t are "real , convincing, a nd true" on the 
basis that human nature has changed, and material 
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circumstance no longer conveys the truth or reality of 
11 life itself," as Bennett and the Edwardians suppose it to. 
"Modern Fiction" (1925) is a sort of manifesto for Modern 
fiction, that characterizes the struggle of the Moderns to 
create fiction that depicts a psychological, rather than 
simply material reality. "How it Strikes a Contemporary11 
(1923), challenges the critical preoccupation with the past 
and the usefulness of assessing Modern fiction by standards 
established within a very different social order, and 
suggests that Modern writing should be valued for its 
sincerity and its attempt to come closer to life. "Women 
Novelists 11 (1918) is a review of R. Brimley Johnson's 
survey of women's novels, The Women Novelists. In that 
review, Woolf suggests that any theory as to the course of 
development followed by women novelists must consider not 
only literature, but social history as well. "Men and 
Women 11 (1920), is a review of Leonie Villard's account of 
the "evolution" and "emancipation" of nineteenth-century 
English women, as documented by their characterization in 
novels. Woolf qualifies Villard's project by noting that 
the women characters in novels by men misrepresent women as 
what men desire women to be or wish to be themselves; or, 
such characters may simply be scapegoats for the general 
ills of humanity. Significantly, Woolf agrees with 
Villard's insistence on the importance of women working (in 
the factories) as a prelude to their intellectual freedom. 
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Woolf also notes in this review the restrictions placed on 
women's writing by the fact that language and the forms of 
literature have been shaped by men. Finally, "The 
Intellectual Status of Women" (1918), is Woolf's rebuttal 
of Desmond Maccarthy's support for Bennett's claim that 
"women are inferior to men in intellectual power" to which 
he adds that "no amount of education and liberty of action 
will sensibly alter." Woolf counters that their conclusion 
lacks substantive evidence (women having been denied 
education and liberty for centuries), and that women's 
advances from century to century have been "immense." 
7 McNeillie adds the note to this essay that suggests that 
in addition to the change in reign from King Edward VII to 
King George V, this date also alludes to the fact that: 
"The First Post-Impressionist Exhibition opened at Grafton 
Galleries on 8 November 1910, the ramifications of which 
startling event were yet to be fully registered in 
(Woolf's] fiction" (Virginia Woolf's Essays 437). 
8 In "From Beyond the Reaches of Feminist Criticism: a 
Letter from Paris," Shari Benstock attests to the relevance 
of Woolf's practice, as she similarly seeks to 
recontextualize Gertrude Stein's literary project, 
extricating it from assessments that "discuss her work 
within the confines of the modernist project" (25), and 
according to "the dictates of modernist thought" (26), 
without acknowledging "the set of masculine claims and 
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heterosexual values embedded in the work of modernism" 
(13). In her larger project of contemplating the future of 
feminist critici sm, Benstock mediates between the women 
critics "who suggest that women should look to themselves 
and their own experience for models of critical discourse 
and those who suggest we should look beyond male-female 
dichotomies" (27). These alternatives seem curiously 
parallel to the alternatives Woolf mediates between 
in A Room of One's own--"a room of one's own" and 
"androgyny." Indeed, Benstock engages the question of the 
future of feminist criticism in much the same way Woolf 
engaged the question of the future of women's fiction, and 
to much the same end. See also "Two Modernist 
Interpretations: Linguistic Routes and Postwar Despair" and 
"Alternative Moderni sms" in Benstock, Women 24-34. 
9 In A Room of One's Own, the term "chastity" encompasses 
both women's ignorance of sexual matters, and their lack of 
egotism and concern for fame (the latter quality is also 
referred to as "anonymity" [49-50]). 
10 In the version of HSC that Woolf revises for The Common 
Reader, she satirizes the critical preoccupation with the 
past: " it would be better to retreat, as Matthew Arnold has 
advised, from the burning ground of the present 
to the safe tranquillity of the past ... a study of the 
classics i s to be recommended. Moreover, life is short; 
the Byron centenary is at hand; and the burning question of 
the moment is, did he, or did he not, marry his sister?" 
(245). 
11 Woolf incorporates the terms "evolution" and 
"emancipation" from Villard's book into her own argument. 
See note 6. 
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12 Notwithstanding Woolf's mocking comment in ISW, "though 
women have every reason to hope that the intellect of the 
male sex is steadily diminishing, it would be unwise, until 
they have more evidence than the great war and the great 
peace can provide, to announce it as fact" (56). However, 
that assertion is intended as a pointed rejoinder to 
MacCarthy's wi llingness to pronounce women as 
intellectually inferior, rather than as a serious prognosis 
of male intellect. 
13 John Burt makes a relevant argument in his intriguing 
article, "Irreconcilable Habits o f Thought in !::. Room of 
One's own and To the Lighthouse." He explains that the 
central argument of A Room of One's own--that women's 
writing will gain authority as the economic and social 
circumstances that restricted their access to literary 
production are rectified--depends upon a "progressive view 
of human nature," a view clearly discredited by the first 
world war: "the war reveals facts about human nature that 
make every hope about moral advancement and progress mere 
wishful thinking." The underargument then "idealizes the 
imaginative androgyny of the past" in order to displace the 
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post-war fear and antagonism between the sexes with a 
longing for a more peaceful coexistence. Burt acknowledges 
that such "androgyny" "idealizes the very sexual 
transaction that was the source of the problems that the 
major argument was intended to solve," yet contends that 
the hope for the future that "androgyny" is meant to 
salvage is not rational but emotional. 
However, in interpreting the relationship between the 
two arguments, Burt places an unwarranted emphasis on male 
response as indicative of the prospects for women. While 
the war revealed that women's oppression by men was 
symptomatic of a larger will-to-power, it also provided 
some women the opportunity to escape such oppression by 
earning their own living. Although Woolf indicates 
(through Beton) that the sex-consciousness of men is a very 
real concern (particularly as it becomes embodied by a 
political movement such as Fascism), she reaffirms the 
necessity of women pursuing the economic, intellectual, and 
sexual autonomy .symbolized as "a room of one's own." She 
does not, as Burt asserts, "take back her argument in a 
limited way" to "appease the force of the unspoken argument 
of the war, which might otherwise have repealed a 
progressive essay entirely" (894). 
14 Judith Johnston notes Woolf's awareness of the rise in 
fascist sentiment in Britain in the early 1930's, 
demonstrated by the resurging popularity of Sir Oswald 
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Mosley, a British fascist who had enlisted the support of 
Harold Nicolson (Vita Sackville-West's husband) for his 
party. Nicolson represented them in Parliament. See "The 
Remediable Flaw: Revisiting Cultural History in Between the 
Acts." 
15 These allusions are detailed in Jane Marcus's 
"Sapphistry: Narration as Lesbian Seduction in A Room of 
One's Own," a provocative reading "based on its relation to 
the trial of Radclyffe Hall 's novel, The Well of Loneliness 
(1928), for obscenity" (163). 
16 Beton's criticism of Mr. A's purposeful and self-
conscious indecency echoes her criticism of James Joyce's 
"conscious and calculated indecency" in B&Br (210), and in 
MF and HSC. 
17 In Three Guineas, Woolf argues convincingly that the 
repression of women within patriarchy parallels the 
political repression within fascism, that in fact, fascism 
originates in the power dynamics of the patriarchal family . 
While this position was radical and reviled at the time, 
its thesis has gained credibility as feminist scholars such 
as Maria-Antoinetta Macciocci have demonstrated that the 
ideology of fascism required the sexual and social 
repression of women, relegating them to sexual and 
reproductive functions. See also Barrett 14-15, Marcus 79 -
82, and Johnston 253-258. 
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18 sandra Gilbert provides a thorough discussion of male 
sex-consciousness following WWI, in the essay, "Soldier's 
Heart: Literary Men, Literary Women, and the Great War." 
Signs 8:3 (1983), 422-450 . For an even more comprehensive 
discussion, see War of the Words by Gilbert and susan 
Gubar, in which they argue not only that "modernism, 
because of the distinctive social and cultural changes to 
which it responds, is differently inflected for male and 
female writers," but that such difference is inscribed in 
twentieth-century literature specifically as a conflict, a 
battle of the sexes (xii). 
19 Showalter claims that this "I" is not only impersonal, 
but desexed. However, the "I" is identified specifically 
as Mary Beton later in the text; furthermore, all of the 
options Woolf suggests are a Mary of some last name or 
other. 
20 Because my arguments insists that Virginia Woolf 
distinguishes her views from those of the narrator/persona 
Mary Beton by a narrative frame, I maintain that 
distinction in my own references to the various views 
articulated in A Room of One's Own. 
21 Bazin links manic depression to the polar opposites of 
feminine and masculine and applies Woolf's metaphor of 
androgyny to an attempt to find balance between the two. I 
believe that she forces the hi-polarities of sexuality onto 
the hi-polarities of manic depression. Her reading of To 
96 
the Lighthouse, in particular, characterizes the 
relationships between Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay too narrowly. 
22 Woolf discredits Browning's derogatory statements about 
women students by juxtaposing his utterance "the best woman 
was intellectualy the inferior of the worst man" with his 
subsequent return to his quarters (derived from a 
biographical anecdote), where he remarks of the obviously 
uneducated and disadvantaged stable boy laying on h is sofa, 
"he's a dear boy and really quite high-minded.'' Wool f 
implies that his sexual preference determines his 
assessment of female intelligence. Marcus c l arifies this 
argument in Virginia Woolf and the Languages of Patriarchy. 
She notes that the homosexual academics of Woolf's own 
circle, Lytton strachey, E.M. Forster, and Lowes Dickinson, 
identified with the power of the patriarchy rather than 
with "outsiders,'' such as women. As part of the 
"homosexual hegemony over British culture derived from the 
values of the cambridge Apostles and King's College," they 
practiced a misogyny as debilitating as their fathers•. By 
attacking Browning, their "philosophical father," Woolf was 
able to express the anger that she was unable to direct 
toward her friends (76, 137, 164). 
23 In other of Woolf's works, such relationships with men 
are shown to be conducive to women's expression of 
themselves: the platonic sharing (advocated in Three 
Guineas) as demonstrated in To the Lighthouse by the 
relationship between Lily Briscoe and William Bankes and 
between Lily and Augustus carmichael, and at one time 
between Mrs. Ramsay and Augustus carmichael; the 
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hedonistic, as demonstrated by Mrs. Manresa in Between the 
Acts; and the illicit, as demonstrated by Aphra Behn or 
George Eliot (ROO 110) . 
24 This passage initiates an on-going debate amongst 
feminist critics over whether women should c l aim a share in 
the literary tradition and linguistic practices that 
already exist, establish. a separate canon and a different 
relation to language, or devise an entirely new language. 
A sense of the major issues involved in these respective 
arguments can be found in Nina Baym's "The Madwoman and her 
Languages: Why I Don't Do Feminist Literary Theory," in 
Benstock, Feminist Issues 45-61, Sandra Gilbert's ''Woman's 
Sentence, Man's Sentencing: Linguistic Fantasies in Woolf 
and Joyce," in Marcus, VW and Bloomsbury, 208-14, and in 
Nora Eisenberg's "Virginia Woolf's Last Word on Words: 
Between the Acts and 'Anon'." 
25 Here Beton incorporates a gender stereotype from 
patriarchy into her theory for women's authority. There 
are other instances too, where her theorizing is marred by 
the apparent acceptance of such limitations; for instance, 
her assertion that women's creative power "differs greatly 
from the creative power of men. And one must conclude that 
it would be a thousand pities if it were hindered or 
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wasted, for it was won by centuries of the most drastic 
discipline, and there is nothing to take its place. It 
would be a thousand pities if women wrote like men, or 
lived like men, or looked like men ... Ought not education to 
bring out and fortify the differences rather than the 
similarities? For we have too much likeness as it is ... " 
(152). While it may be argued in this instance that 
Beton's plea accepts the stereotypes that patriarchy has 
imposed on women, stereotypes which have already led to 
different educations for men and women--his formal and paid 
for, and hers informal and untutored. However, it is the 
example of Olivia having to "devise some entirely new 
combination of her resources, so h i ghly developed for other 
purposes, so as to absorb the new into the old without 
disturbing the infinitely intricate and elaborate balance 
of the whole" (147) that has prompted Beton's musing on the 
nature of women's creative power; it is more specifically 
that women writers should acknowledge and adapt what they 
have learned from the past, rather than emulating men that 
Beton is concerned with. 
26 Woolf's use of concentric frames to qualify various 
assertions or positions is used also i n Between the Acts 
and Three Guineas. In Between the Acts, the message at the 
center of the vignette within the play within the pageant 
wi thin the novel is "La, to think I read it in a book and 
cried for another," which one could argue is Woo l f's 
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injunction for us in the outer frame to resist the frame-
jumping narrator of that book, who in the final passage 
makes the audience passive witnesses to an archetypal rape. 
27 Beton satirizes the ends to Which such figures use 
their authority: "I thought of that old gentleman, who is 
dead now, but was a bishop, I think, who declared that it 
was impossible for any woman, past, present, or to come, to 
have the genius of Shakespeare. He wrote to the papers 
about it. He also told a lady who applied to him for 
information that cats do not as a matter of fact go to 
heaven, though they have, he added, souls of a sort" ( 8 0) • 
28 Woolf discusses "the conspiracy of silence" that the 
male literary establishment and press practice regarding 
the political advances by women in Three Guineas. See in 
particular 162, note 16. 
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